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NOTES AND COMMENTS




The globalization of the world's equity markets is creating difficult
enforcement issues for international securities regulators. Although in-
ternationalization facilitates the free flow of capital, it also increases
the opportunity for fraudulent trading practices. Because the actions of
stock market participants in one country's market affect the partici-
pants in another country, economic policies of isolationism are not the
correct course of action. Conversely, a country's unilateral attempts to
correct perceived regulatory deficiencies are likely to create more
problems than they solve. The only realistic solution to improving inter-
national securities regulation involves a mutual consensus of market
regulators who are committed to solving securities trading abuses.
To achieve a consensus, however, each participant must have an un-
derstanding of the unique cultural and historical background of the
country in which the regulated activity occurs. Each country's develop-
ment of securities regulations has a unique economic, political, and cul-
tural background; thus, it is nearly impossible for market regulators to
correctly apply regulatory standards derived soley domestically. Before
a common standard of market evaluation may be derived, it is essential
for all countries to recognize the need for parity in capital trading prac-
tices to accommodate the growing interlinking of the international eco-
nomic markets.
Part I of this Comment discusses Japan's emerging position as the
world's financial leader. Part II notes the response of the United States
to the difficulty of enforcing securities regulations in the international
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market, focusing specifically on actions taken in Japan. Part III exam-
ines the historical, political, and legal contexts in the development of
Japan's securities regulation. Part IV compares the development of
stock-trading regulations of the Japanese equity markets to that of the
United States. Part V examines the specific Japanese legal provisions
pertaining to unfair stock transactions on the Japanese stock market.
Part VI discusses the Japanese market regulators and their effective-
ness in policing the securities market. Finally, Part VII suggests the
reintroduction of an autonomous securities regulatory government
agency, using the Japanese Fair Trade Commission as a model similar
to that of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
I. GLOBALIZATION-JAPAN AS THE WORLD'S
FINANCIAL LEADER
Until recently, most commentators considered the Japanese equity
trading practices unimportant because they believed that the Japanese
stock markets were "isolated."' Beginning in 1978, however, the Japa-
nese stock markets grew at an annual compound rate of twenty-three
percent and began to assume global importance.2 In the spring of 1987,
the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) surpassed the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) in market value of shares and became the largest ex-
change in the world.
The growth of the Japanese stock markets reflects the trend of
globalization of the world's equity markets and dispels prior misconcep-
tions that the TSE does not affect other countries." The development of
1. See, e.g., Fingleton & Jackson, So a Gamble Came Unstuck Get an Ambulance,
EUROMONEY, Mar. 1987, at 155, 156 (noting the earlier belief that the Japanese stock
markets were too small with which to be concerned).
2. See Perlmutter, Developments in Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS (Sept. 17, 1987) (WESTLAW, Law Rev. library, PLI
file) (describing the growth of the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges).
3. Id. Concurrently, the Osaka Stock Exchange, Japan's second largest, surpassed
the London Stock Exchange to become the third largest exchange in the world. Id.; see
also NIKKO RESEARCH CENTER, LTD., THE NEW TIDE OF THE JAPANESE SECURITIES
MARKET 16 (1988) [hereinafter NIKKO] (listing the 1987 total market value and vol-
ume of turnover of securities (in United States dollars) for Tokyo as $2.98 trillion and
$1.71 trillion, for New York as $2.21 trillion and $1.87 trillion, and for London as
$660 billion and $270 billion).
4. See Bornstein & Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 2
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 375, 376 (1987) (discussing that the growth in transnational
trading widens the scope of securities violations and creates problems in securities en-
forcement); Japan's Effort to Fight Insider Trading Must Overcome the Acceptance of
the Practice, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1988, at 12 [hereinafter Acceptance] (noting that




a global market with nearly twenty-four hour tradingO has blurred na-
tional boundaries so that prices are now established by international
supply and demand.6 The significance of players' identities continues to
diminish as foreign investors increasingly participate in Japan's previ-
ously domestically homogenous markets.'
The participation of foreigners on the TSE has grown significantly.8
In 1986, for the first time, the TSE granted six foreign corporations
memberships on the Exchange.9 Market analysts expect the number of
foreign corporations listed on the TSE to increase from fifty-eight to
several hundred by 1991.10
The world's equity forums are linked not only through foreign par-
ticipants, but also through electronic telecommunication devices and
computers.1 Electronically-linked brokers on each trading floor further
facilitate global trading. 2 The TSE linkage,13 one of a number of inter-
5. Acceptance, supra note 4, at 12. The developing global market is described as a
market without boundaries and where transactions "can be affected on a twenty-four
hour basis or close to it." id.; Melting Clocks, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1985, at 82
(describing that international securities trading occurs all but 3.5 hours of the day).
6. See Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introducing Remarks, 2 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 303, 303-05 (1987) (discussing the driving forces of globalization, includ-
ing the increased availability and demand for capital, investor's abundance of disposa-
ble liquidity, the changing political and economic policies favoring economic deregula-
tion, the abandonment of fixed exchange rates, the trend towards the
institutionalization of investments, and the increasing levels of technology); Note, Bar-
riers to International Flow of Capital: The Facilitation of Multinational Securities
Offerings, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 82 (1987) (noting that the reasons for the
internationalization of securities includes computer advances, the international diversi-
fication of funds, capital accumulation in large funds, and changes in tax laws).
7. See Cox, Internationalization of the Capital Markets: The Experience of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 11 MD. J. INTL L. & TRADE 201, 208 (1987)
(noting that the stock of 410 companies are traded in the issuer's domestic market and
at least one foreign market).
8. See Perlmutter, supra note 2 (discussing the TSE's 1986 opening of member-
ship to foreign brokerage companies). As of the middle of 1987, the Ministry of Fi-
nance (MOF) had licensed thirty-six foreign financial institutions to conduct securities
business through Japanese branch offices, compared to ten institutions in 1985. Id.
9. Id.
10. See The Nikko Perspective on International Equities (Sponsored Supplement),
EUROMONEY, Nov. 1986, at SS3 (noting that the securities markets of the United
States are no longer domestically confined because the securities issued by American-
based corporations are traded on foreign exchanges, and foreign securities are pur-
chased and sold on domestic exchanges).
11. See Grass, Internationalization of the Securities Trading Markets, 9 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 17, 37 (1986) (noting the development of the American and Toronto stock
exchange linkages); see also Bernard, International Linkages Between Securities Mar-
kets: "A Ring of Dinosaurs Joining Hands and Dancing Together?" 2 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 321, 328 (1987) (stating that the first stock market link, although not interna-
tional, was the Intermarket Trading System, established in 1978).
12. See Grass, supra note 11, at 37-38 (discussing that the purpose of electronic
linkages is to provide for the direct flow of orders between the two trading floors and to
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national market linkages,' 4 allows computer assisted orders and stock
trading through computer terminals.'"
In addition, one of the few Japanese attorneys specializing in securi-
ties notes that lax securities regulations in Japan allow the Japanese
securities houses to amass large amounts of capital. 16 Consequently, the
Japanese securities companies can then enter foreign markets with a
substantial edge and, thereby, erode the leveled playing field that the
United States seeks to maintain.'" Currently, Japan's main exports are
the commodities of money and financial services which are as readily
available for export as manufactured goods have been in the past.' 8
The Japanese government's securities regulator, the Ministry of Fi-
nance (MOF), does not admit to planing to turn Japanese financial
services into an export product.' 9 Whether due to Japanese planning or
the macro-economic policies of the United States,20 however, the Japa-
nese financial houses are gaining an unprecedented influence over the
allocation of global resources.2' Therefore, Japan's market practices
can no longer be thought of as restricted only to Japan.
facilitate transactions on each exchange).
13. Id. at 38. The Tokyo Stock Exchange Linkage Computer-assisted Order Rout-
ing and Executive Systems (CORES) permits computer trading of over two thousand
stocks. Id.
14. See Bernard, supra note 11, at 333-36 (describing the United States OTC's
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system and the
London Stock Exchange's Automated Quotation market data link, the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange mutual offset linkage, and the Amer-
ican and Toronto trading linkage).
15. See Grass, supra note 11, at 38 (discussing CORES).
16. Jameson & Schoenberger, Tokyo Exchange Now Charting a Global Course,
L.A. Times, Aug. 15, 1988, part IV, at 2 (quoting Seijiro Wantanabe as stating that
Japanese financial investment allows for amassing capital).
17. Id.
18. See Cottrell, Plenty of Room at the Top for the Big Four, FAR E. ECON. REv.,
Sept. 11, 1986, at 87 (comparing Japan's present exportation of currency with the pre-
vious exportation of manufactured goods).
19. Id.
20. See JAPAN ECONOMIC ALMANAC: 1987 18-20 (1988) (discussing the yen appre-
ciation through United States policy manipulation and market pressure). The Japanese
refer to the "strong-yen-induced crunch" as endaka. Id. at 5.
21. See J. BURNSTEIN, YEN-JAPAN'S NEW FINANCIAL EMPIRE AND ITS THREAT
TO AMERICA 126 (1988) (noting that in 1987 the Japanese financial services company,
Nomura, had the highest market capitalization and corporate net income in the world).
Nomura's global equity trading volume is twenty times greater than the largest United
States firm. Id.; see also Bernard, Internationalization. Recent Developments in Ja-
pan's Securities Markets, in BROKER-DEALER INSTITUTE 1986: NEW PRODUCTS, 24-
HOUR TRADING, FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, MARKET INFORMATION (Sept. 29, 1986)
(WESTLAW, Law Rev. library, PLI file) (noting that Nomura has forecasted that the
companies revenues will be balanced at a fifty-fifty level split between domestic and
foreign transactions within the next five years).
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II. THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO
PERCEIVED SECURITIES TRADING ABUSES IN JAPAN
The growth in the international stock markets facilitates the free
flow of capital and the efficient allocation of resources.22 International-
ization, however, also increases the potential for securities fraud. 23
Without international cooperation among regulators, investors in for-
eign markets will face increased exposure to fraudulent stock trading
practices.24
As the interaction between the Japanese stock exchanges and other
securities markets continues to grow, market regulators are beginning
to recognize the need to coordinate surveillance and enforcement poli-
cies among the major markets.25 In the United States, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recognized that the difficulty of
collecting foreign evidence may limit the international enforcement of
securities laws.26 Moreover, a foreign country's bank secrecy laws and
blocking statutes prevent the production of evidence and, thus, may im-
22. See Gruson, supra note 6, at 306 (stating that the free flow of capital across
national boundaries enables the most efficient distribution of investment resources);
Cox, supra note 7, at 202 (stating that corporations benefit from internationalization
because of increased stability and liquidity, a potential increase in interest in the com-
panies products, and the facilitation of foreign acquisitions). Investors benefit because
they are able to diversify their investments and seek out higher returns; whereas, secur-
ities companies benefit by being able to broaden product lines. Id.
23. See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 4, at 376 (describing that the increase in
international trading augments the potential of securities fraud and complicates the
policing of the markets). The numerous regulatory problems are due to the limited
ability of a country's enforcement system and self-regulatory organizations to investi-
gate and adjudicate. Id.
24. As Global 24-Hour Trading Nears, Regulators Warn of Market Abuses, Wall
St. J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 25.
25. See SEC Staff Report, The October 1987 Market Break, MUTUAL FUNDS
GUIDE, No. 498, Feb. 9, 1988, at 11-21 (discussing the need for global securities regu-
lators to cooperate in order to ensure the integrity of the securities markets); Report of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce on the Internationalization of the Securities Market (Interim Report), Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 88, 299 (Oct. 9, 1986) [hereinafter Interim Report] (recog-
nizing the growing need for cooperation in international securities enforcement).
26. See Note, Transactional Securities Fraud: Are the United States Courts Clos-
ing Their Doors to Foreign Plaintiffs?, 22 Irr'L LAW. 1171, 1173 (1988) (stating that
under traditional principles of international law, the United States can assert jurisdic-
tion over extrajurisdictional conduct that has domestic repercussions). But see Begin, A
Proposed Blueprint for Achieving Cooperation in Policing Transborder Securities
Fraud, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 66 (1986) (discussing that competing national traditions
hinder discovery of information located abroad, often complicating international securi-
ties enforcement); Grass, supra note 11, at 54 (stating that although the extraterrito-
rial reach of a nation's securities laws may be recognized and asserted, other countries
may impose obstacles to enforcement).
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pede the surveillance of a domestic market.17 For example, the United
States was frustrated in its attempts to compel the Toyota Corporation
to produce documents28 located in Japan,2" despite a tax treaty to the
27. See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 4, at 410 (explaining that the two most
serious obstacles to international enforcement of securities laws, other than the diffi-
culty of reaching a common consensus on terms, are blocking statutes (nonwaivable
general prohibition of disclosure covering the inspection or removal of documents) and
bank secrecy laws (a prohibition on a bank from disclosing information)); Ferrara &
Mackintosh, Legal Representation in the International Securities Market: Represent-
ing a Party or Witness in a SEC or SRO Proceeding, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS 141 (1988) (noting that blocking statutes vary and depend on a foreign
country's concern for safeguarding the information); Mann & Mari, Current Issues in
International Securities Laws Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
68 (1988) (stating that the blocking laws represent governmental control on the distri-
bution of certain information outside its territory; whereas, secrecy laws give individu-
als the right to require others to keep specific information secret); see also INTERNA-
TIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL
LAWS 8-9 (1988) [hereinafter ICC] (stating that nearly twenty countries have blocking
statutes, including Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom); see, e.g., Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 1984-85, ch. 49, § 5(l) (author-
izing the Canadian Attorney General to prohibit the disclosure of information and
comply with a foreign court order if the disclosure would adversely affect Canadian
interests); The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 11 (prohibiting domes-
tic courts from complying with foreign court orders if the orders infringe on the United
Kingdom's jurisdiction or are "otherwise prejudicial" to the United Kingdom's sover-
eignty); Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise (July 16, 1980) (forbidding
French nationals from communicating economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or
technical matters to foreign authorities).
Secrecy laws can take a variety of forms. See Mann & Mari, supra, at 71 (stating
that secrecy laws can range from a fiduciary relationship, waivable only by the princi-
pal, to a statute incurring a state interested confidentiality); see also Brister, Regula-
tion of International Markets-Solutions, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
INSTITUTE 231, 233 (1987) (describing a foreign bank's "devil's alternative" of either
complying with a United States court order to disclose the name of a customer or abide
by its duty of confidentiality to the customer). The number of countries with blocking
statutes differs with the source consulted. Compare Note, The Future of Global Secur-
ities Transactions: Blocking the Success of Market Links, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 283, 293 n.48 (1987) (stating that approximately 20 countries have bank se-
crecy statutes including Austria, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Germany, Greece, Panama, and Switzerland, and that Anguilla, Antigua,
Barbados, Bermuda, Caicos, Israel, Monsterrat, the Netherlands, St. Vincent, and Tur-
key have customs similar to secrecy laws) with Brister, supra, at 233 (approximating
the number of countries that have bank secrecy laws to fifteen).
The antisuit injunction, a third type of "anti-litigation device," is a judicial action
aimed at restricting litigation. See Mann & Mari, supra, at 67 (describing the antisuit
injunction as a court order aimed at preventing a party from seeking relief in another
court or complying with another court's order). The antisuit injunction is in "considera-
ble disfavor" and is less of an impediment to litigation than blocking statutes and se-
crecy laws. Id. at 67-68.
28. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulations Through Bilateral Agreements
With the United Kingdom and Japan: An Interim Measure or a Solution?, 23 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 251, 257 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation] (stat-
ing that although no specific blocking statute exists in Japan, the government effec-




The United States efforts to address international securities enforce-
ment obstacles focus primarily on three methods: unilateral enforce-
ment of United States securities laws abroad, multinational mutual-
assistance treaties, and bilateral agreements.31
A. UNILATERAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
1. The "Waiver-By-Conduct" Approach
In the mid-1980s, the SEC introduced for comment the "waiver-by-
conduct" approach. 2 This proposal provided that those trading in
United States securities waive the protection of "otherwise applicable
foreign secrecy laws" and that the purchasing or selling of securities
"constitutes an irrevocable consent to disclose."13 The response to the
SEC proposal was extremely unfavorable.34
Commentators warned that the adoption of the waiver-by-conduct
approach would have an adverse impact on the United States as a par-
29. See United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158, 1162-64 (C.D.
Cal. 1983) (holding that Toyota was required to produce documents pertaining to an
alleged shift in corporate income from Toyota USA to Toyota Japan); see also Ohara,
Judicial Assistance to be Afforded by Japan for Proceedings in the United States, 23
INT'L LAW. 10, 27-28 (1989) (noting the Japanese case of Mitsui Steamship Co. 1.
FMC in which the court instructed the company not to comply with an order from the
United States to provide documents).
30. Convention Between the United States of America and Japan for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income, July 9, 1972, United States-Japan, art. 26, 23 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No.
7365.
31. See Exchange Release No. 21,186, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 86,983 (July
30, 1984) [hereinafter Exchange Release] (noting the three approaches that the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission considered as a response to the globalization of the
securities markets).
32. Id. at 86,977.
33. Id. at 86,985; Brister, supra note 27, at 243 (explaining that the principle
behind waiver-by-conduct is that a participant in the United States securities markets
must play by the rules of the United States securities market).
34. See Begin, supra note 26, at 87-90 (describing the adverse public response);
Mann & Mari, supra note 27, at 111 (noting that the proposal received a negative and
adverse reaction). The authors discussed three general objections: first, waiver-by-con-
duct represented an extraterritorial extension of American law; second, under most for-
eign laws it would be unenforceable; and third, the adoption of waiver-by-conduct
would reduce the number of investors because of the desire to participate in a less
regulated market. Id.; Brister, supra note 27, at 246-52 (describing criticisms of
waiver-by-conduct, including the fact that waiver-by-conduct avoids normal judicial as-
sistance channels, and, therefore, would be ineffective against "sophisticated fraud-
sters"); ICC, supra note 27, at 16 n.60 (noting that European and Canadian govern-
ments are opposed to waiver-by-conduct, based on the assertion that private foreign
organizations may not waive the mandatory laws of their home jurisdiction).
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ticipant in the international market.3 5 Additionally, critics contended
that the adoption of the waiver-by-conduct approach would have no
effect on foreign blocking laws and could provoke the passage of more
blocking laws.3 6 Currently, although there are suggestions of an at-
tempted revival,37 most commentators feel that the waiver-by-conduct
approach is a dead proposal38 with the SEC even disparaging unilateral
attempts at international securities regulation. 9
2. Court Order to Compel Information
A United States court may request through diplomatic channels that
Japanese courts provide assistance in the production of evidence.4 0 In
1905, Japan enacted the Reciprocal Judicial Assistance to Be Given at
the Request of Foreign Courts Act (Reciprocal Act).4 1 The Reciprocal
Act requires specificity in document requests; general requests for in-
formation will be denied.4 2 The Reciprocal Act, however, does not af-
ford assistance to the SEC.43 Moreover, the request by the court may
take up to one year to complete. 44 In an alternative to using the Recip-
rocal Act, a United States court may issue an order to compel the pro-
35. See, e.g., Brister, supra note 27, at 252 (explaining that many commentators
believe that the adoption of waiver-by-conduct would reduce domestic investment).
36. See Exchange Release, supra note 31, at 1 83,648 (stating that the waiver-by-
conduct approach would fail because it does not address blocking laws, thereby, limit-
ing its effectiveness); Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 263
(noting that a private party may not waive because they are designed to protect a
state's interest in nondisclosure). Contra Nelson, Insider Trading Originating Abroad
and "Waiver by Conduct," 19 INT'L LAW. 817, 820-21 (1985) (commenting that
blocking statutes are generally enacted for different reasons than securities regulation).
37. See SEC, House Clash Over Handling of Suspicious Trades by Foreigners, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 872 (June 10, 1988) [hereinafter SEC and House Clash]
(quoting Syracuse University Law Professor Sandra Hurd testifying before Congress,
that waiver-by-conduct would be "direct, clear, and easy to implement"). The professor
stated that only waiver-by-conduct would be effective to enforce international securities
regulation. Id.
38. See Begin, supra note 26, at 92 (describing the waiver-by-conduct proposal as
dead).
39. SEC and House Clash, supra note 37, at 873. The United States Securities
and Exchange Commissioner testified that unilateral attempts are "time consuming,
expensive and a strain on international relations." Id.
40. Ohara, supra note 29, at 19.
41. Id. at 28. The requests must come through diplomatic channels and contain a
translation in Japanese with the requesting state guaranteeing payment for the ex-
penses incurred in the execution of the request. Id. In addition, reciprocal judicial assis-
tance must be afforded to the Japanese courts. Id.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Goldstein, Goodwin & Popofsky, Conducting Discovery Abroad in Federal
Court Litigation, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 1988 (Dec. 1,
1988) (WESTLAW, Law Rev. library, PLI file).
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duction of information and may institute a contempt proceeding for
noncompliance with the court order."
B. MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
Multilateral negotiations pertaining to securities are infrequent.4 0 Al-
though multinational conferences may reduce tensions between nations
and provide a forum for dispute resolution,47 the diversity of national
interests greatly reduces the chance for success of a multilateral ac-
cord." Although the United States is a signatory to several multilateral
securities agreements,49 the United States and Japan are not yet bound
by any multilateral conventions for evidentiary cooperation.
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad (Evidence
Convention),5" to which the United States and Japan are both signato-
ries, applies to every "civil or commercial case" in which a party trans-
mits a document abroad.51 The Evidence Convention provides for meth-
ods of discovery in foreign countries, 2 but Japan has not yet ratified
it.53 Even if Japan were to ratify the Evidence Convention it would be
of limited use to the SEC because the treaty is usually implemented
only in connection with litigation, not pretrial discovery." Additionally,
45. See Comment, Comparative Analysis of Recent Accords Which Facilitate
Transnational SEC Investigations of Insider Trading, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE
243, 245 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Comparative Analysis] (noting instances
where a court can compel information through a court order and contempt
proceedings).
46. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 264 (stating that
multinational securities regulatory accords are rare, probably because of dissimilar
laws).
47. Exchange Release, supra note 31, at T 86,982.
48. Id.
49. See CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 541 (1984) [hereinafter CURRENT
TREATIES] (presenting the major multinational treaties to which the United States is a
signatory).
50. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters (Evidence Convention), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
51. See Ferrara & Mackintosh, supra note 27, at 146-47 (noting the application of
the Evidence Convention). The signatories attach different meanings to the terms civil
and commercial. Id. Japan's interpretation excludes administrative matters. Id.
52. See Mann & Mari, supra note 27, at 93 (describing the three devices a treaty
encompasses for foreign discovery: letters rogatory, evidence-taking by a consular offi-
cial, and private commissioners).
53. See Ohara, supra note 29, at 10, 18 (stating that the United States and Japan
have not established multinational evidentiary cooperation).
54. Mann & Mari, supra note 27, at 93-94; see Ferrara & Mackintosh, supra note
27, at 147 (noting that the Evidence Convention is available for pretrial discovery if it
is relevant to the trial). This standard is a difficult standard to meet because the evi-
dence sought is often not dispositive proof of violative conduct, but a conduit to discov-
ery of such proof. Id.
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utilization of the Evidence Convention has proven costly and time
consuming. 55
Effective multilateral accords can eliminate conflicting regulations
between nations and conserve finite financial resources because each
regulatory agency does not have to negotiate separately with each
country. 56 Nevertheless, to date, multinational efforts at resolving se-
curities regulatory conflicts have not been successful. 57 The major rea-
son for this failure appears to be the inability of the countries to reach
a consensus on binding terms.58
C. BILATERAL ACCORDS
1. The Consular Convention
Japan and the United States entered into the Consular Convention in
1964.51 Under the Consular Convention, a United States consular of-
ficer may take depositions on behalf of the courts of the United
States.60 The deposed must voluntarily give the deposition and the con-
sular officer must depose the witness in accordance with Japanese
law.6 ' Because pretrial discovery is sharply limited in Japan, the Con-
vention's effectiveness as an enforcement tool has been slight.6 2
2. Memoranda of Understanding
A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the parties gives
assurances of mutual cooperation and allows the two nations' regula-
tory agencies to share information.6 3 Unlike some bilateral trea-
55. See Interim Report, supra note 25, at 1 88,301 (stating that discovery under
the Evidence Convention is expensive and slow).
56. See Begin, supra note 26, at 96 (noting that multilateral approaches are supe-
rior to bilateral approaches because the bilateral approaches result in an expensive
patchwork of regulations).
57. See 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATIONS §
2.20[3] (H.' Bloomenthal ed. 1988) (denoting the failure of multilateral accords).
58. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 267 (stating that
multilateral enforcement agreements are unlikely to succeed because of different inter-
national attitudes and laws).
59. Consular Convention, Mar. 22, 1963, United States-Japan, 15 U.S.T. 768,
T.I.A.S. No. 5602, 518 U.N.T.S. 179.
60. See Ohara, supra note 29, at 18 (describing the bilateral convention).
61. Id. at 18-19 (noting that the United States consular officer may take deposi-
tions on behalf of authorities in the United States in a manner consistent with the law
of Japan).
62. See Mori, The Difference Between U.S. Discovery and Japanese Taking of Evi-
dence, 23 INT'L LAW. 3, 3 (1989) (pointing out that little pretrial discovery is allowed
in Japan).
63. See Mann & Mari, supra note 27, at 85 (stating that MOU provides for the
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ties 6 4 the SEC's MOU do not contain a dual criminality require-
ment 5 The SEC has entered into MOU with Switzerland,'0 the
United Kingdom,67 Canada,68 Brazil,69 and Japan.
In May 1986, the MOF and the SEC signed a MOU.70 The accord
contained three objectives: to improve the protection of investors, to
assure adequate supervision of securities companies, and to prevent de-
ceptive securities transactions. 1 The United States-Japan MOU was
designed to facilitate each agency's respective request for supervisory
and investigatory information on a case-by-case basis.72 No public en-
forcement actions to utilize the agreement have been reported.7
exchange of information and assurances of cooperation between the SEC and foreign
agency inquiries).
64. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with the Republic of the
Netherlands and the United States, June 12, 1981, United States-Netherlands,
T.I.A.S. No. 10734 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1983) (reading that in executing the
request, compliance is required if compulsory measures are mandated in the requested
states' jurisdiction).
65. See Mann & Mari, supra note 27, at 86 (stating that the SEC's MOU do not
require that the act complained of is a violation of law in both countries). In the past,
conduct that was proscribed in one country that was not against the law in the other
hampered enforcement efforts where a dual criminality requirement existed. Id.
66. Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for
Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading,
Aug. 31, 1982, reprinted in 22 1.L.M. 1 (1983).
67. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the
SEC, CFTC, and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters
Relating to Securities and Futures, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at V 88,244 (Sept. 23, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1431 (1986).
68. See Begin, supra note 26, at 73-74 (describing the exchange of correspondence
between the Ontario Securities Commission and the United States SEC which
culminated in a letter of confirmation pledging information assistance).
69. See Mann & Mari, supra note 27, at 92 (noting the MOU between the SEC
and Brazil's Comissado de Valores Mobiliaros).
70. Memorandum of the United States SEC and the Securities Bureau of the Japa-
nese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Information, Securities and Exchange
Commission, News Release No. 86-34 (May 23, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1429
(1986); Begin, supra note 26, at 74-75; Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra
note 28, at 262-63.
71. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 263 (stating the
objectives of the MOU). The MOU generally makes its effectiveness dependent on the
good will of the agencies and contemplates negotiations when necessary. Id.
72. See Begin, supra note 26, at 74 (stating that to facilitate the timely processing
of requests, each agency agrees to appoint specific contact personnel).
73. See Perlmutter, supra note 2 (noting that the MOU has not been utilized). On
January 11, and 12, 1989, members of the Japanese Securities Bureau met with mem-
bers of the SEC and jointly reiterated their "cooperative intention." SEC. Japanese
Officials Meet, Reaffirm "Cooperative Relationship," Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 17,
1989) (WESTLAW, Securities library, BNA file). The representatives agreed to
strengthen their cooperative relationship and to organize a "working group," providing
an assembly for regular discussions. Id. Former United States SEC Chairman Ruder
stated in March 1989 that the cooperation received from the United States-Japanese
MOU "has been first rate." Tightening of Insider Trading Memo Denied, Jiji Press
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3. Analysis of Bilateral Accords
In addition to the MOU, the United States has entered into several
bilateral agreements that may be utilized for securities regulation.1
The SEC Chairman, David Ruder, has commented that bilateral
agreements are the most effective means of obtaining information lo-
cated in foreign countries.7 5 Bilateral agreements may be the most ef-
fective method of addressing the problem of international securities
fraud.7 6 Not all individuals involved in the securities market, however,
are in favor of the bilateral agreement structure.
The SEC has called the bilateral agreements time consuming and
has stated that their adoption would lead to an uneven "patchwork" of
differing provisions.7 Furthermore, Gary Mountjoy of the United
States General Accounting Office (GAO) raised allegations before a
congressional subcommittee that the SEC failed to investigate suspi-
cious trades even when a bilateral agreement existed. 8 Mr. Mountjoy
Ticker Serv. (Mar. 22, 1989) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
74. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey, June 7, 1979,
United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1981) (providing for mutual assistance with the production of evidence); The Treaty
Between the United States and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, May 25, 1983, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S.
No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss MAC] (providing for
assistance in locating and obtaining testimony of witnesses and service of judicial docu-
ments, but providing for a dual criminality requirement); see also Ferrara & Mackin-
tosh, supra note 27, at 138 (noting that the United States has proceeded with mutual
assistance negotiations with Colombia, Italy, Morocco, Canada, and the Cayman
Islands).
The SEC may institute only civil or administrative proceedings. Mann & Mari,
supra note 27, at 72. The SEC may utilize bilateral criminal treaties for the production
of evidence, however, because United States securities laws provide criminal sanctions.
Id.; see United States Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, 77q (1982) (specifying
that violations of the specific provisions are unlawful) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. §
77x (1982) (proscribing penalties for willful violators of the Securities Act of a fine up
to $10,000, and/or five years imprisonment) (emphasis added).
75. SEC and House Clash, supra note 37, at 872.
76. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 268 (stating that
the bilateral approach is preferable because it encourages cooperation and fosters a
mutual recognition of conflicting national resources). The author views multilateral
treaties as "cumbersome." Id.; see also Begin, supra note 26, at 69 (declaring that
bilateral accords have been the most effective device to address international securities
fraud).
77. Exchange Release, supra note 31, at 1 88,4011; see also Note, Enforcing Secur-
ities Regulation, supra note 28, at 268 (stating that bilateral agreements are time con-
suming and expensive); Comment, Comparative Analysis, supra note 45, at 224 (call-
ing bilateral accords piecemeal resolutions that cause the problems to shift to other
forums, rather than offering other resolutions).
78. See SEC and House Clash, supra note 37, at 872 (noting the testimony of a
member of the GAO).
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gave testimony alleging that because of the SEC's concern that a for-
eign government will no longer welcome its presence, vigorous utiliza-
tion of bilateral treaties has yet to occur.79 Moreover, in cases where
the SEC does get involved, the results may be highly protracted be-
cause the foreign government may take up to three years to provide the
requested information."0
In actuality, bilateral agreements may be the best solution to the
difficult situation of enforcing securities regulations involving foreign
nations. The MOU, with adequate enforcement, is a pragmatic ap-
proach to obtaining information expeditiously.8' Because bilateral ne-
gotiations force the United States to acknowledge and respect a foreign
nation's right to create and enforce its own legal system, bilateral
agreements appear to be the best option.82
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE SECURITIES
MARKET
The modern Japanese commercial legal system is a unique hybrid of
European civil law and United States common and statutory law super-
imposed onto a distinctly far eastern legal, social, and cultural sys-
tem.83 Japanese trading methods first developed in the mid-seventeenth
century on the Osaka rice market.84 As the markets further developed,
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Mann & Mari, supra note 27, at 86.
82. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 268 (stating a
preference for MOU); see also Gardner, Pitt, Hardison & Salzer, SEC Enforcement
Actions, in SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 1988 (June 2, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Law Rev. library, PLI file) (noting that MOU offer three major benefits: they may
establish detailed procedural guidelines, they may establish a timetable for response to
United States SEC requests, and they do not require formal ratification by the United
States Congress, allowing the SEC to utilize the agreement earlier than other accords).
83. See Hahn, An Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 517, 522 (1983) (discussing the development of the Japanese commercial legal
system); Introduction to Japanese Law, 1 Jap. Bus. L. Guide (CCH) 8-870 (1988)
(describing the Japanese Civil Code as primarily of Germanic origin with approxi-
mately twenty to thirty percent of its text based on French and Swiss precedents).
84. See JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 106 (L. Loss, M. Yazawa & B. Bunoff
eds. 1983) [hereinafter JAPANESE SECURITIES] (describing the development of the
Osaka rice market); see also T. ADAMS, JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKETS: A HIsToRI-
CAL SURVEY 11 (1953) (noting that the Dojima rice market in Osaka was first offi-
cially recognized in 1730). A rice ledger system developed on Osaka facilitating the
hedging and trading of fictitious transactions. Id. at 10. The Meiji government actively
stabilized the price of rice by directly influencing the market. Id.
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arbitrage85 became the major method of conducting business, 8 inject-
ing a speculative atmosphere into the markets which still exist today.
87
The Meiji government, in power from 1868 to 1912,18 enacted the
earliest Japanese securities legislation, the Stock Transfer Ordinance of
187489 (STO of 1874). The STO of 1874, a translation of the London
Stock Exchange Rules,90 was the Japanese government's attempt to fa-
cilitate Japanese integration into world trade.91 Although the London
Stock Exchange based rules were designed for stock transactions, few
securities were actually traded in Japan during this period.9 2 Ulti-
mately, the STO of 1874 failed because it did not address the Japanese
arbitrage transactions. 3
85. See R. MILLER & R. PULSINELLI, MODERN MONEY AND BANKING 113 n.8
(1985) (defining arbitrage as the simultaneous purchase and sale of an item to exploit
an artificial price difference).
The trading of rice resulted in a mix of commodity trading and equity trading tech-
niques and significantly influenced modern trading methods on the exchanges. T. AD-
AMS, supra note 84, at 8-12. On the Osaka Exchange, commodities were exchanged
with contracts for reimbursement by a certain date. JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note
84, at 106. Clearing agents acting as arbitragers received the contracts for payment.
Id.
86. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 106 (elaborating that while the
spot and arbitrage transactions existed at the beginning of the Osaka Exchange, spot
transactions were subsequently dropped).
87. See JAPANESE SECURITIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SECURITIES MARKETS IN JA-
PAN 1988 18 (1988) [hereinafter JSRI 1988] (noting that the origins of Japanese se-
curities markets with the speculation against customer orders and fictitious trading cre-
ated practices that currently exist); see also 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 1.02[3] (Z.
Kitagawa ed. 1988) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN] (explaining that the Japa-
nese securities market has played a limited role in government and corporate financ-
ing). One of the many distinctions between the Japanese and the United States stock
markets is that Japan's equity markets have not been viewed as performing a primary
capital formation function. Id.
88. See Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 41-62 (A. Angelo trans.
1976) (explaining the Meiji regime and the Western influence on the Japanese
culture).
89. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 8 (1971) (tracing Japan's
early development of securities laws).
90. See T. ADAMS, supra note 84, at 16 (noting that the securities regulations of
1874 were based on the rules of the London Stock Exchange); JAPANESE SECURITIES,
supra note 84, at 106 (discussing the adoption of the London Stock Exchange's consti-
tution and its rules); see also Fingleton & Jackson, supra note 1, at 157 (describing the
Meiji government's adoption of an Anglo-American modeled stock market system in an
attempt to reduce speculation).
91. See Y. NODA, supra note 88, at 42-43 (discussing the pressure on Japan to
follow the Western countries' legal systems in order for Japan to remain autonomous).
92. Id. at 26. The main transactions in Japan were based on speculative rice and
grain transactions. Id. at 27.
93. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 106 (emphasizing that the failure
of the STO of 1874 was a result of the small number of securities exchanged and the
nonexistence of permanent stock exchanges).
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The Stock Exchange Ordinance of 1878" (SEO of 1878) superseded
the STO of 1874.11 The SEO of 1878 established the Tokyo and Osaka
stock exchanges. 96 Similar to the old rice exchange markets, the stock
exchanges under the SEO of 1878 continued to use an arbitrage settle-
ment method."7
After several unsuccessful attempts to further reform the securities
regulations,"8 the Japanese government enacted the Exchange Law of
1893 (Exchange Law),9 9 incorporating key provisions of the SEO of
1878. The Exchange Law provided for the organization of stock ex-
changes as stock corporations whose shares could be traded on the
exchanges.100
The Japanese government, hoping to continue Japan's industrializa-
tion, anticipated that the Exchange Law would facilitate long term
capital formation.101 Prior to World War II, a limited group of compa-
nies called zaibatsu controlled the majority of stock holdings in large
corporations. ' 2 Thus, instead of the equity market providing long-term
94. Id.
95. Id. at 26.
96. See 3 INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: JAPAN, 13 (K. Tsunematsu,
S. Yanese, M. Yasuda, & T. Takuoka trans., R. Rosen ed. 1986) [hereinafter Rosen]
(discussing the establishment of the Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges). Government
bonds, including those issued to feudal lords, were traded on these exchanges. Id. The
STO of 1874 called for the establishment of the Osaka and Tokyo exchanges, although
they were not immediately established. T. ADAMS, supra note 84, at 16. Significant
transactions in corporate shares did not occur until 1894. Id. at 12.
97. See T. ADAMS, supra note 84, at 12 (stating that the trading in corporate
shares occurred using the trading methods of the old rice exchange).
98. JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 107. In 1887, the Bourse Regulations
were enacted and designated to reform the exchanges under the Anglo-Saxon model.
Id. The attempted reforms failed. Id.
99. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 3 (describing the Exchange Law of 1893 as the
main regulation of the stock exchanges until World War II). The Exchange Law of
1893 revised existing securities regulations, but continued to follow the trading meth-
ods of the old rice exchanges. JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at 20 (noting that the transac-
tions were for gambling purposes rather than for changes of ownership).
100. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 27 (discussing the incorporation
of the stock exchanges and the ability to trade the shares of stock on the exchanges).
The exchanges, functioning as profit making entities, derived revenue from commis-
sions on the sale of their own stock. A. VINER, INSIDE JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS
54 (1988).
101. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 4 (discussing the Japanese government's hope
that the stock exchanges would facilitate long-term capital formation).
102. Prewar zaibatsu existed in Japan for centuries, and the first of the four major
zaibatsu date to the sixteenth century. See H. IYORI, ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN
JAPAN 2 (1969) (describing the emergence of the zaibatsu families); see also H. IYORI
& A. UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 4 (1984) (noting that during the
Meiji period the zaibatsu established holding companies that generally controlled its
subsidiaries through equity ownership, the license to appoint subsidiary directors, and
the use of interlocking directorates); Miaswa, Securities Regulation in Japan, 6 VAND.
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capital, the zaibatsu facilitated capital formation. 10 3 Because the
zaibatsu held a concentration of the corporate shares, individual inves-
tors played an insignificant role in the securities markets. The Ex-
change Law lasted until World War II, when the government subse-
quently incorporated key provisions of it into the Securities Exchange
Act of 1943.104
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) promul-
gated the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948105 (SEL) as a replace-
ment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1943 to dissolve the zaibatsu
and form a democratic capital market in Japan. 106 Under pressure
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 447, 448 n.4 (1973) (defining zaibatsu as a "money-clique," "plutoc-
racy," and large industrial banking combinations); THE HOLDING COMPANY LIQUIDA-
TION COMMISSION, LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE RECONSTRUC-
TION AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 9 (1949) [hereinafter
HOLDING COMPANY] (describing zaibatsu as unique to Japan, extending over many
areas of business and exercising large amounts of control over Japan's trade and indus-
try); Comment, Corporate Governance in Japan. The Position of Shareholders in Pub-
licly Held Corporations, 5 U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 141 n.12 (1983) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Shareholders] (describing zaibatsu as "large holding companies" and "financial
oligarchies" closely tied with the government).
103. See Miaswa, supra note 102, at 448 (discussing that until the dissolution of
the zaibatsu, capital requirements were met either through zaibatsu banks or zaibatsu
holding companies); Rosen, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that the zaibatsu and the gov-
ernment provided long-term capital).
The dissolution of the zaibatsu required a large scale redistribution of previously
concentrated stock holdings. T. ADAMS & I. HOSHII, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
NEW JAPAN 43 (1972). The Allies instructed the shares to first be distributed to em-
ployees and residents of where the factory was located and then to the general public.
Id. One commentator has suggested that the dissolution of the zaibatsu after World
War II, which allowed more extensive public involvement in stock transactions, facili-
tated the acceptance of the Anglo-Saxon securities regulatory structure. JAPANESE SE-
CURITIES, supra note 84, at 107-08.
104. See DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 1.02[2] (describing the
Exchange Law of 1893 and its subsequent replacement in 1943 by the Securities Ex-
change Act); JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at 33 (noting that the existing stock exchanges
were consolidated into one joint stock company in 1943). The exchange's primary ob-
jective was to fix and stabilize the prices of the securities traded. Id.
105. See DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 1.0213] (discussing the
adoption of the Securities Exchange Law (SEL)); Rosen, supra note 96, at 4-5 (noting
the adoption of the SEL and stating that it remains the main source of present securi-
ties regulation).
106. See DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 1.02[3] (stating that the
Allied forces wanted to end the zaibatsu and advance the securities laws ideals of the
United States to form a democratic capital market); HOLDING COMPANY, supra note
102, at 8, 10 (describing the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 as requiring the construction
of a democratic Japanese economy that would be achieved through the destruction of
the zaibatsu); Comment, Shareholders, supra note 102, at 141 (discussing that the
SCAP reforms were aimed at reducing economic concentration to increase shareholder
freedom).
Although the allies wanted to reconstruct Japanese corporate ownership into demo-
cratic control, this structure was foreign to the Japanese. See Note, Trustbusting in
Japan: Cartels and Government-Business Cooperation, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1064, 1065-
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from SCAP10° to incorporate principal provisions borrowed from the
United States Securities Act of 1933108 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,109 the Japanese Diet (Diet)"0 enacted the legislation with
little debate.1" Although the Japanese traded securities for nearly two
centuries, for the first time, Japan's securities laws had regulations
against market manipulation and insider trading.11 2 The SEL also es-
tablished the Japanese Securities Exchange Commission (JSEC), a
counterpart of the SEC, to enforce the SEL's provisions."
66 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Trustbusting] (stating that democratic ideals contra-
dicted the cooperative business environment within Japan).
SCAP's failure to dismantle the zaibatsu banking infrastructure and its failure to
realize the importance of the zaibatsu significantly contributed to a subsequent re-
grouping of prewar components into groups called keiretsu. A. VINER, supra note 100,
at 55-56. Keiretsu exist through mutual agreement using interlocking and mutual
shareholding; it created precedent for postwar neo-zaibatsu organizations. Id. at 56; see
also infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing Japan's current stable
share-holding corporate practices).
107. See Miaswa, supra note 102, at 448 (describing the enactment of the SEL as
a condition precedent for reopening the stock exchange). The allied forces stopped
trading on the Japanese Stock Exchange on August 9, 1945, and the Japanese Securi-
ties Exchange closed in 1947 permanently. Id.; JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at
28 (discussing the suspension of trading in 1945 and the subsequent dissolution of the
Japanese Securities Exchange in 1947). But see T. ADAMS & I. HOSHU, supra note
103, at 38 (noting that although the allies closed the stock exchanges, trading resumed
on the over-the-counter market immediately after the war); see also infra note 230 and
accompanying text (comparing the over-the-counter markets of Japan and the United
States).
108. United States Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-7711 (1934), amended
by 15 U.S.C. § 77a-7711 (Supp. V 1987).
109. United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1934),
amended by § 78a-78jj (Supp. V 1987).
110. The Japanese Diet is the "[h]ighest organ of state power and the sole legisla-
tive organ of the state." 2 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, PACIFIC BASIN §
2.3(B) (1984) [hereinafter PACIFIC BASIN] (quoting article 41 of the Japanese
Constitution).
S111. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 29 (describing that prior to the
passage of the law, the Diet debated the merits with "cursory deliberation"); M. TAT-
SUTA, supra note 88, at 10 (noting that the SEL was enacted without debate due to
urgent demand to reopen the stock exchange and the unlikelihood of obtaining SCAP's
approval of any changes).
SCAP simultaneously revised the Japanese Commercial Code utilizing the United
States Uniform Stock Transfer Act of 1909 (USTA) and the Illinois Business Corpora-
tion Act of 1917 (IBCA). See Comment, Shareholders, supra note 102, at 143 n.26
(describing the use of the USTA and the IBCA). The Illinois statute was most likely
used because a SCAP official assisting with the drafting had lived in Chicago rather
than the statute's excellence. Id.
112. See DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 1.02[2] (analyzing the
introduction of the proscription against insider trading and market manipulation). The
Act also introduced the requirements for the registration of securities and the separa-
tion of the securities business from commercial banking. Id.
113. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 29-30 (discussing the establish-
ment of the JSEC in 1948 and its subsequent abolishment in 1952); DOING BUSINESS
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Commencing with the departure of the SCAP in 1952, the Diet has
frequently amended the SEL,"14 resulting in a substantial reduction of
securities trading restrictions and a general trend toward the former
system of zaibatsu trading activities. In 1953, the Diet abolished the
JSEC and it's responsibilities were absorbed by the MOF.1" The Diet
also allegedly abolished a key SEL provision that required insiders to
report stock transactions because it was "ineffective." ' Commentators
contend that the abolition of the reporting requirement essentially nul-
lified the prohibition against insider trading.'17
As amended, the SEL currently provides for the prohibition against
market manipulation" 8 and insider trading. 1 9 In addition, it contains
general antifraud provisions. 20 These provisions, however, have not
stopped the prohibited activities because of subsequent amendments to
the SEL and an apparent government public policy of nonenforce-
ment."' Furthermore, unlike the United States, a plaintiff's securities
bar 22 has not developed in Japan. 23 Consequently, no significant com-
IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 1.02(4) (explaining the establishment of the JSEC in
1948 and the abolishment of the JSEC four years later); Miaswa, supra note 102, at
479 (analyzing the abolition of the JSEC and its subsequent absorption into MOF); see
also infra note 190 and accompanying text (commenting on the JSEC and purported
justifications for its abolition).
114. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 28-34 (noting the twenty amend-
ments to the SEL since its adoption in 1948).
115. See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text (describing the statutory pow-
ers of the MOF).
116. See Ishizumi, Insider Trading Regulation: An Examination of Section 16(b)
and a Proposal for Japan, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 488 (1979) (discussing the abol-
ishment of article 188, which was comparable to section 16(a) of the United States
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Article 188 required that directors and officers re-
port the amount and the type of security ownership. Id. Scholars have speculated that
rather than being ineffective, the requirement was perceived as excessive. Id. at 488-89.
117. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text (pointing out the difficulty for
potential plaintiffs to discover a securities law violation).
118. See infra note 143 and accompanying text (providing article 125 of the Secur-
ities Exchange Law which prohibits market manipulation).
119. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (explaining the prohibition of
insider trading in article 189 of the SEL).
120. See infra notes 175-88 and accompanying text (analyzing articles 50 and 58
of the SEL antifraud provisions).
121. See Miaswa, supra note 102, at 507 (stating that because no reported cases of
insider trading exist in Japan, there are obvious enforcement problems); Chira, Japan's
Different Stock Market, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at D6 (quoting a MOF official
stating that no insider trading exists in Japan).
122. See Pitt & Shapiro, Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: A Legislative
Initiative for a Sorely Needed Clarification of the Law Against Insider Trading, 39
ALA. L. REV. 415, 416 (1988) (noting that plaintiffs in the United States have shaped
the definition of securities laws).
123. See M. TATSUTA, supra note 89, at 5 (comparing the large amount of judicial
precedent in the United States with the scarcity of case law in Japan); Miaswa, supra
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mon law precedents have evolved to proscribe insider trading activities.
IV. COMPARISON OF THE EQUITY MARKETS IN THE
UNITED STATES AMD JAPAN
Scholars have long believed that market manipulation and insider
trading are endemic in Japanese stock exchanges. 24 Until very re-
cently, however, scholars have been more concerned with market ma-
nipulation of stock prices than insider trading. 2 As this Comment dis-
cusses earlier, general concern over insider trading has greatly
increased because of the growing interlinking of securities markets."2
The inconsistent application of securities trading regulations between
Japan and the United States may be traced to the different historical
and political origins of the Japanese securities market and its structural
donor, the United States. In response to the Depression, Congress en-
acted the United States Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 as part of Roosevelt's New Deal' 1" to stabilize the
securities markets and protect individual investors.2 8
Japan, however, did not enact its securities laws in response to an
economic crisis; instead, Japan enacted the laws to promote the nation's
economic development and participation in the international market-
place. In Japan, an elite group of business and government officials for-
note 102, at 494 (hypothesizing that the lack of securities litigation is a result of cul-
tural and structural barriers); infra notes 260-71 and accompanying text (discussing
the various systemic barriers to litigation that potential plaintiffs must face, including
the low number of litigators, the high cost of filing claims, and Japanese attorneys'
unfamiliarity with securities law).
124. See Fingleton & Jackson, supra note 1, at 156 (describing stock price manip-
ulation and securities "broker churning"-excessive nonspeculative trading by brokers
for commission-as frequently occurring on the Japanese stock exchanges).
125. See id. (noting one researcher calling insider trading, as compared with mar-
ket manipulation, "small potato[es]"); Zoglin, Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge
to the Integration of the Japanese Equity Market Into the Global Securities Market,
2 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 419, 421-22 (1987) (describing market manipulation on the
Japanese exchanges as a much larger problem than insider trading).
126. See Fingleton & Jackson, supra note 1, at 156 (discussing the increased atten-
tion on market regulation because of the growth of the global market and the partici-
pation of foreign firms); Zoglin, supra note 125, at 419 (maintaining that the growth
and internationalization of Japan's equity market has added pressure on Japan to more
actively prohibit insider trading); see also Peters, Overview, of International Securities
Regulation, 6 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 229, 230 (1988) (noting that market international-
ization leads to market interdependence).
127. L. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAws 1 (1987) (describing
the securities laws of the United States as a "quintessentially New Deal").
128. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 7 (1983) (describ-
ing securities regulations as a safeguard for the United States economy and protection
for the individual investor through disclosure).
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mulates domestic economic policy. 1' The group shares a common un-
derstanding of the importance of economic planning for the future of
Japan, and unlike the United States,130 the mutual sharing of informa-
tion between Japanese businesses has traditionally been encouraged.' 3'
Motivation for stock ownership in Japan is also different from that in
the United States. In the United States, stocks are widely held and are
expected to deliver a return on investment in the form of dividends and
capital gains. In Japan, however, a widespread system of interlocking
directorships exists with extensive cross-holdings of shares.13 2 Stock-
holders cross-hold stocks to perpetuate business relationships and to re-
duce the possibility of takeovers, 133 which have been historically and
culturally disfavored in Japan.' As a result, over sixty-five percent of
corporate equity is kept out of the market, creating a "thin float" be-
cause of the few stocks that are publicly traded. 35 The low number of
129. Note, Trustbusting, supra note 106, at 1064.
130. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (holding that every
combination in restraint of trade is illegal).
131. Note, Trustbusting, supra note 106, at 1064. Collusion is thought of as coop-
erative effort, and cooperation is believed to be the superior way to implement national
economic policies in Japan. Id.
132. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulations, supra note 28, at 255 n.26 (dis-
cussing that a comprehensive system of interlocking directorships exists). These direc-
torships facilitate insider trading. Id.; see also JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at 58-59
(noting that individual shareholding, as a percentage of total outstanding shares,
dropped from sixty-one percent in 1950 to twenty-four percent in 1986).
133. See Lehner, Japan's Bias Against Domestic Mergers May Become Trade Is-
sue, Tokyo Fears, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at A18 (explaining that most big Japanese
companies put large blocks of their stock in the hands of their customers, suppliers, and
banks, thus, protecting themselves from takeovers); Perlmutter, supra note 2 (stating
that corporations hold each other's shares for reasons other than the realization of capi-
tal gains or receipt of dividends); Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan. Opportunism, Ideol-
ogy and Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1987) (asserting that Japa-
nese firms operate with either an explicit or implicit agreement that neither firm will
trade the other's stock in a hostile takeover bid); A. VINER, supra note 100, at 129
(noting that corporations frequently borrow from keiretsu institutions minimizing the
risk of early cancellation of loans); Comment, Shareholders, supra note 102, at 147-48
(describing the concentration of stock in "safe hands" and the high incidence of corpo-
rate cross share-holdings).
134. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (elaborating on the practice of
cross-holding of shares to repel takeovers); Nishimara, Corporate Acquisitions in Ja-
pan: Evolving Business and Legal Environment, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING Busl-
NESS WITH JAPAN: 1985 181 (1985) (discussing that acquisitions have traditionally
been referred to as nottori ("hijacking")). The Japanese have viewed takeovers as hi-
jacking because, in the past, most attempted takeovers were not really takeovers at all,
rather the acquiring corporation purchased the target's stock hoping to induce the tar-
get management to repurchase the shares at a premium. Id.; A. VINER, supra note 100,
at 94 (describing kaishime as where groups purchase large blocks of stock and corpora-
tions directly buy back the stock at a premium).
135. See Fingleton & Jackson, supra note 1, at 156 (stating that under the Japa-
nese system of stable shareholding, approximately sixty-five percent of the shares are
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public transactions facilitates price manipulation because major share-
holders and brokerage firms that control a large percentage of available
stocks may unilaterally influence share prices.'
Although no laws expressly prohibit takeovers,8 7 labor '38 and busi-
ness 3 9 do not welcome the practice. Unlike corporations in the United
States, Japanese companies are not regarded as the disposable property
of the shareholders, but as the property of the management, the work-
ers, and the shareholders. 140 There are indications, however, that Japa-
nese corporations are becoming more receptive to takeovers.1 41 For ex-
ample, Nihon Keiza Shimbun, Japan's leading business newspaper,
forecasted in the early 1980s that a significant growth in acquisitions
was likely to occur.14 2 If the Japanese anxiety about takeovers declines,
excluded from the market); Zoglin, supra note 125, at 421-22 (describing that a stable
shareholding practice exists among institutions to promote business relationships and
that it removes sixty to seventy percent of outstanding shares from active trading).
136. See Perlmutter, supra note 2 (stating that the large investors and brokerage
firms control a large percentage of the limited floating shares available and are there-
fore able to unilaterally influence share price); see also JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at
59-60 (noting that the practice of interlocking shareholding undermines the function of
the securities exchanges, alienates the investing public from issuers, and negatively ef-
fects the efficiency of trading and the equitable price determinations of stocks).
137. See JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at 188 (noting that although Japan does not
have a law against takeovers per se, takeovers must meet increasingly stringent an-
timonopoly statutes). Foreign investors may acquire up to ten percent of a Japanese
corporation without contacting the Japanese government if they purchase through des-
ignated securities companies. Id. If a foreign investor acquires over ten percent of a
corporation, the government may disapprove the sale. Id.
In addition, businesses are sold less frequently in Japan than in the United States for
tax reasons. See Brockman, Alternatives for Entering the Japanese Market, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN: 1985 59-60 (1985) (describing how the
Japanese tax structure exempts individual sellers from the capital gains tax unless the
sale is of a "controlling interest" of a corporation).
138. See Fingleton, Tokyo Takeovers Are for Japanese Only, EUROMONEY, Feb.
1986, at 114 (discussing that the traditional lifetime employment system has been an
obstacle to takeover attempts). Japanese workers view the corporation as a family and
the company president in a patriarchal role. Id.; see also Yoshino, Japanese Trade and
Investment Strategies, Including Current Policies and Restrictions Affecting Trade
and Investment in Japan, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE
PACiic BASIN 13, 16 (1987) (describing that Japanese companies are viewed as com-
mon properties). If a company is taken over, the workers may respond with a labor
disturbance. Id.
139. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (explaining the Japanese sys-
tem of interlocking directorships and cross-holding of shares).
140. See Yoshino, supra note 138, at 16 (describing that Japanese companies are
viewed as common properties).
141. See Ames, Entering the Japanese Market Via Acquisitions, in LEGAL AS-
PECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN: 1985 93, 105 (noting that although the Japa-
nese dislike acquisitions for cultural and sociological reasons, the number of acquisi-
tions will most likely continue to rise).
142. Id. (referring to an article in Nihon Keizai Shimbun stating that foreign ac-
quisitions in Japan are likely to increase); Freadhoff, Picken's Battle to Control Koito
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then shareholder diversification may increase, and the opportunity to
manipulate stock prices will diminish due to the dilution of concen-
trated stock holdings. Of course, the shareholder base may not increase
percentagewise if the new companies also participate in the close-hold-
ing practices.
V. MARKET MANIPULATION, INSIDER TRADING, AND
ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
A. MARKET MANIPULATION
Article 125 of the SEL 143 contains provisions similar to section 9(a)
of the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4 Article 125
prohibits any sale or purchase of securities not involving any change in
the ownership for the purpose of defrauding others or conducting any
manipulative transaction in any security listed on a securities ex-
change.1 45 Although the government may invoke criminal sanctions
140
May Mark End of Era for Japan, Investor's Daily, Oct. 30, 1989, at 7 (noting that
there are signs of increasing takeovers in Japan); see also A. VINER, supra note 100, at
89 (stating that as deregulation continues in the Japanese capital markets, war-
rants-debt securities that allow the holder to buy the issuer's common stock at a fu-
ture date at a specified price-and convertible bonds will facilitate hostile takeovers).
143. Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 125 (amended 1981)
(Jap.) (elaborating on the prohibition on washed sales, manipulation of stocks, and
restriction on stabilizing activities). Article 125 of the SEL states in pertinent part:
No person shall engage in following [sic] acts for the purpose of creating false or
misleading appearance with respect to the status of transactions in any security,
including for instance a false or misleading appearance of active transaction of
certain securities listed on a securities exchange ... [and] no person shall engage
in following [sic] acts for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of any
security on the securities market ... to effect or to entrust or to be entrusted, by
himself or with other persons, a series of transactions in the security concerned
creating a false active trading in such security or making the price of such secur-
ity fluctuate ....
Id.
144. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1982). Section
9(a) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful . . . [flor the purpose of creating a false or misleading ap-
pearance of active trading ... to effect alone or with one or more other persons,
a series of transactions in any security registered on a national securities ex-
change creating actual or apparent active trading in such security or raising or
depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or
sale of such security by others.
Id. The fact that no Japanese equivalent to section 10(b) of the United States Securi-
ties Exchange Act exists is particularly noteworthy. Miaswa, supra note 102, at 504.
145. Securities and Exchange Law, art. 125 (Jap.).
146. See id. art. 197 (elaborating on the penal provisions for violations of article
125). Sanctions for violations include three-year imprisonment with hard labor or a fine
up to three million yen. Id. SEL article 197 provides in pertinent part:
Any person who falls under any of the following Items shall be confined to im-
prisonment with hard labor for not more than three years or be fined not more
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and hold a violator liable for damages, 4 the government rarely applies
article 125 because of the difficulty in proving the intention of the
violator.1
48
A shareholder of a Japanese corporation may sue for damages result-
ing from the illegal acts under the Commercial Code."4 The share-
holder may also sue in tort under the Civil Code. 10 Without a criminal
or administrative proceeding to reveal the level of manipulation, how-
ever, a shareholder may have great difficulty in proving that any dam-
ages occurred through the illegal conduct."" Not surprisingly, stock-
holder suits for price manipulation have yet to be reported.
8 2
than three million yen .... Any person who, for the purpose of public offering of
new or outstanding security, buying or selling or other transactions of any secur-
ity or of attempting to fluctuate quotations of any security, has circulated false
rumours, used deceptive schemes ... (or) who violated the provisions of Article
58 and Article 125 ....
Id.; see also id. art. 207 (applying SEL article 197 to an organization's representatives
or managers).
147. Id. art. 126 (requiring damages from violators of article 125 for qualified per-
sons who sustained the damage). Article 126 states in pertinent part:
Any member who acted in contravention of the provision of the preceding Article
shall [sic] liable to compensate the damage sustained by any person who made or
entrusted transaction of the security concerned at a price which was affected by
such act ....
Id.
148. See M. TATSUTA, supra note 89, at 87 (discussing the difficulty of establishing
the "purpose" of the parties). The United States SEC proves the intent of the parties
through circumstantial evidence that may be collected through stock watch systems,
but the MOF has no comparable system. Id.; see also Miaswa, supra note 102, at 506
(elaborating on the fact that the MOF has not regulated stock price manipulation be-
cause of the difficulty in proving intention and the MOF's finite resources).
149. See INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: JAPAN § 11.12 (M. Tatsuta
ed. 1986) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES] (noting that a shareholder who has
held shares for at least six months can bring a derivative suit on behalf of the share-
holder's corporation against the company's directors and supervisors for damage sus-
tained by the corporation); see also SHOHO (COMMERCIAL CODE), Law No. 48 of 1899,
arts. 267-268-3 (Jap.) (allowing for derivative suits).
150. See INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES, supra note 149, at § 11.12 (stating that for
the tort provision to apply, the plaintiff must establish the defendant's illegal conduct
as well as causation and damages).
151. See id. at § 11.1115] (indicating that the plaintiff must prove that the dam-
ages occurred as a result of the defendant's illegal conduct); see also infra notes 162-63
and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of discovery without a reporting
provision).
152. See Miaswa, supra note 102, at 505 (stating that no stockholder suits have
occurred for violations of article 125). In 1984, the first conviction for price manipula-
tion of stock prices in a primary offering occurred. A. VINER, supra note 100, at 98
n.18. In 1988, the Tokyo Supreme Court upheld a fine equivalent to S2300 and a sus-
pended sentence arising from the 1972 market manipulation case. Sanger, Insider
Trading, The Japanese Way, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1988, at DI, D5.
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B. INSIDER TRADING
1. Articles 188 and 189 of the SEL
Article 189 of the Japanese Security Exchange Law' 53 is the func-
tional equivalent of the short-swing prohibition incorporated in the
United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 16(b). 114 Arti-
cle 189 requires management and/or ten-percent shareholders' 5  to dis-
153. Securities and Exchange Law art. 189 (Jap.) (elaborating on Japan's insider
trading provision). Article 189 states in full:
1. For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of secret information of a corpo-
ration which may have been obtained by any officer or major shareholder (the
term refers to the shareholder or the contributor who holds or owns more than
ten percent of the corporation's total number of issued shares or the total amount
of contributions in his own name or in the name of other persons including ficti-
tious person; the same shall apply hereinafter) of the corporation by reason of his
office or position in the corporation, if such person realizes any profit by doing
purchase within six months after sale, or sale within six months after purchase,
of shares of the corporation, the corporation may claim him to tender such profit
to the corporation.
2. If the corporation fails to claim, in accordance with the provisions of the
preceding Paragraph, within sixty days after any shareholder of the corporation
made a request that the corporation shall claim in accordance with the provisions
of the preceding Paragraph, such shareholder may claim in the name of and on
behalf of the corporation.
3. The right to claim to the officer or major shareholder under the provisions of
the preceding two Paragraphs shall be cancelled unless the claimant exercises it
within two years from the date on which such profit was realized.
4. The provisions of the preceding three Paragraphs shall not be applied to the
case where such major shareholder was not such either at the time of purchase or
sale.
Id. Unlike the equivalent American provision, article 189 of the SEL does not provide
for the recovery of attorney's fees. Smith, Commercial Law, Jap. Bus. L. Guide (CCH)
1 14-390 (1988).
154. See Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 489 (describing Japan's SEL article 189 as
analogous to the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 16(b)); cf.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). Section 16(b)
provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase ... within any period of less than six months . . . [shall] be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such benefi-
cial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted ... by the owner of any
security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall
fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail dili-
gently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more
than two years after the date such profit was realized . ...
Id.
155. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 189 (Jap.) (defining major shareholders
as those who hold or own more than ten percent of the issued shares). Article 189 is
weakened, however, because the provision is inapplicable if the acquisition of stock
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gorge any profits obtained through the use of confidential information
gained from any purchase and sale within six months.""8 A stockholder
may bring a derivative suit if the corporation does not receive the ill-
gotten profits after a shareholder has provided sixty days notice.1 7
A 1953 amendment to the SEL deprived article 189 of its enforce-
ability158 because the amendment eliminated the requirement that cor-
porate insiders and/or ten-percent shareholders report their respective
holdings and changes therein to the government.5 0 The Japanese gov-
brings the purchaser's holding above ten percent. Smith, supra note 153, at f 14-390.
The MOF announced in May 1989 its plans to amend the regulation to require
stockholders who acquire more than five percent of a corporation's outstanding stocks.
Japan to Require More Disclosure on Major Acquisitions, Asahi News Serv. (May
25, 1989) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
156. Securities and Exchange Law art. 189 (Jap.); see also Yanase, Disclosure
System, in LECTURES ON JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 78 (1980) (noting that
article one of the MOF's Ministerial Ordinance Concerning the Fair Practice of Secur-
ities Companies prohibits directors and employees from purchasing or selling securities
based on the use of nonpublic information obtained through the course of their busi-
ness). The MOF proposed to expand the provision in order to apply it to anyone with
confidential information gained from a listed company, a related financial institution,
or government official. See Sneider, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 255, 291 (1988) (noting the proscription of
criminal sanctions for those who purchase or sell stock based on the communication of
material nonpublic information related to a corporation's business from a "company-
related person"). The new amendment does not proscribe insider trading by tippees of
tippees. Id. at 263. See Schoenberger, Japan Will Beef Up Insider Trading Laws, L.A.
Times, Feb. 24, 1988, sec. IV, at 10 (discussing the proposed expansion of article 189
to include "tippees"). In May 1988, article 189 was expanded to include "information
recipients." Id.
157. Securities and Exchange Law art. 189, para. 2 (Jap.) (allowing shareholders,
after sixty days notice and subsequent failure of the corporation to pursue a claim, to
sue on behalf of the corporation).
158. See INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES, supra note 149, at § 11.13 (stating that the
1953 amendment effectively eliminated the insider duty to report changes to the
MOF); Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 488 (finding that the main reason for the inactiv-
ity of article 189 was the deletion of the reporting requirement of article 188).
159. See INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES, supra note 149, at § 11.13 (discussing the
elimination of the insiders' duty to notify the MOF of any changes in stockholding);
Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 488 (stating that under article 188, principal stockholders,
corporate directors, and officers had to report any changes in the amount of securities
owned within ten days after the end of the month); JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note
84, at 194 (addressing the elimination of the duty of insiders to notify the MOF of
changes in stockholding). Article 188 was modeled after section 16(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. §
78p(a) (1982). Section 16(a) states in pertinent part:
Every person ... [owning] more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity
security ... or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall
file ... a statement with the Commission ... indicating his ownership at the
close of the calender month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred
during such calender month.
Id. Commentators have generally acknowledged that the reporting requirement of sec-
tion 16(a) places outside investors on equal footing with insiders because it allows the
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ernment repealed the provision on the grounds that it was inopera-
tive.160 Prior to the amendment, insiders could easily evade the provi-
sion because the government did not publicize the filed reports,
thereby, denying notice to potential plaintiff-shareholders."' 1 Rather
than repealing article 188, the Japanese government could have
strengthened the law by strictly enforcing the reporting provision and
making stock transaction reports public.
The repeal of article 188 left the market regulators unable to moni-
tor those corporate directors, officers, and ten-percent shareholders in-
volved in insider trading. 62 Without the mandatory reporting require-
ment, it was nearly impossible for regulators to discover trading
violations.' 63 Private suits without article 188 were therefore less likely
because potential plaintiffs were unable to discover the violation.
In an attempt to redress these difficulties and in response to public
outcry over perceived trading abuses,16 4 1988 Diet members introduced
new legislation designed to strengthen the insider trading laws in the
spring of 1988.65 Two months later, the Diet amended SEL article 189
monitoring of reports, thereby, alerting the plaintiff's bar, which has primarily been
responsible for enforcement of section 16(b) in the United States. Samuels, Liability
for Short-Swing Profits and Reporting Obligations Under Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, in INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES FILINGS 1988: A SATELLITE
PROGRAM (Feb. 23, 1988) (WESTLAW, Law Rev. library, PLI file).
160. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 194 (stating that the repeal of
article 188 was justified because it was "ineffective"); Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 488
(discussing the SEL's official comment to the repeal of article 188). The official com-
ment was that the provision was "inefficient." Id. at n.209. Some scholars believe, how-
ever, that rather than being inefficient, the provision was perceived as excessive, and
the resultant opposition in the business community was responsible for its abolishment.
Id. at 488-89.
161. See Tatsuta, Ininjo Kisei Kabushiki Kokai Kaitsuke: Naibusha Torihiki, in 2
AMERICA To NIPPON NO SHOKENTORIHIKI Ho 564 (L. Loss & M. Yazawa eds. 1975)
(discussing the ease of evading the provision of article 188 because of the failure of the
MOF to publicize the report).
162. Zoglin, supra note 125, at 420.
163. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of
discovering insider trading violations without article 188).
164. See Insider Trading in Japan--So Many Misunderstandings, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 10, 1987, at 78 [hereinafter So Many Misunderstandings] (discussing the infa-
mous 1987 Tateho Chemical Company scandal). One day prior to Tateho's public an-
nouncement of large losses in government bonds and futures investments, several large
shareholders, including one of Tateho's banks, sold their holdings. Id.; see also Insider
Trading Rules to Take Effect in April, Jiji Press Ticker Serv. (Mar. 13, 1989)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file) (noting an investigation by the Osaka Stock Ex-
change which found the Tateho sales "infinitely close to unlawful conduct," but deter-
mined that the laws were too vague to use for the prosecution of the violations);
Graven, Tokyo Moves Timidly on Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1988, at 8
(stating that the Tateho scandal prompted the Diet to revise the SEL and give the
MOF more investigatory power).
165. See Sneider, supra note 156, at 261 (discussing the introduction of new legis-
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and reintroduced article 188 into law, thereby, strengthening the re-
strictions on short-swing insider trading. 66 Significantly, major share-
holders167 and corporate officers of a listed corporation must now sub-
mit to the MOF a report detailing all applicable stock transactions.16 8
Upon the discovery of a violation, the MOF publishes the stock trans-
action report submitted by shareholders and officers.116  The report
serves as notice of trading violations to potential plaintiffs. In addition,
the laws also establish new criminal penalties for violators.1 0
Because it is unlikely that the Japanese government will enforce the
new sanctions or that shareholder suits will ensue, the effects of the
changes in the law remain largely unknown.171 The MOF's traditional
preference for informal administrative guidance, 72 as opposed to a for-
mal enforcement policy, coupled with the various systemic barriers
shareholders face within the Japanese litigation system173 and the busi-
ness community,1 74 retard the regulation of fraudulent stock trans-
actions.
lation to curb insider trading because of internal public pressure and United States
pressure resulting from the Tateho and the Recruit Cosmos stock scandal); supra notes
164, 180 and accompanying text (describing the Tateho Chemical Company and Re-
cruit Comos stock scandals).
166. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 190 (Jap.) (prohibiting the short sales
of stock).
167. Id. at 188. Major shareholders are defined as beneficial owners of ten percent
or more of stock. Id. But see Smith, supra note 153, at 14,390 (excluding the provi-
sion for ten percent shareholders unless the shareholder owned ten percent prior to the
acquisition).
168. Smith, supra note 153, at 14,310; Sneider, supra note 156, at 291 (discuss-
ing tippee liability for stock transaction violations).
169. See Sneider, supra note 156, at 288-89 (noting that upon receipt of the report,
the MOF will determine whether the party in question received a short swing trading
profit, and unless the profit was tendered to the company within three days, the MOF
will subsequently publish the report).
170. Id. at 289-91 (explaining that executive officers, employees, or other agents
who obtain knowledge of material information related to the business, in connection
with the performance of their duties, who use such knowledge for the purchase and sale
of securities, are subject to up to six months imprisonment and a fine of five hundred
thousand yen).
171. In May 1989, however, a Japanese corporation disgorged short swing profits
made from the purchase and sale of shares between November 1988 and February
1989 of the equivalent of nearly $9 million to the Japanese government. Japanese Firm
Gives Up Trading Profits, L.A. Times, May 17, 1989, at 6.
172. See infra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing administrative guidance
as a very persuasive extralegal source of government power).
173. See infra notes 252-71 (specifying the low number of Japanese litigators, their
unfamiliarity with securities law, and the lack of class actions and contingency fees,
which serve as impediments to potential litigation).
174. See infra notes 272-76 (discussing that some shareholders are viewed as
outside of the corporation).
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2. Security Exchange Law Article 50
Article 50 of the SEL allows the MOF to prohibit conduct that is
detrimental to the objectivity of securities transactions or undermines
the integrity of the industry.17 5 Article 50 also explicitly prohibits em-
ployees and officers of a securities corporation from engaging in insider
trading. 7 6 In addition, the MOF may prohibit securities companies
from engaging in any acts where "[a]n officer or employee[] tak[es]
advantage of special information obtained through his position for sell-
ing or purchasing securities or act[s] solely for the purpose of lucrative
speculation."' 177 The MOF may also apply administrative sanctions
such as the suspension of trading to violators of article 50.178 Further-
more, MOF may also hold directors and officers liable if their conduct
reflects bad faith or a grossly negligent breach of their duties under the
Japanese Commercial Code article 266-3.179 Despite the enactment of
these enforcement provisions, article 50 provisions against insider trad-
ing have been invoked only once. 8
175. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 50 (Jap.) (stating that it is unlawful for
a securities corporation to commit acts prejudicial to the fairness or credibility of the
securities industry). Article 50 states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any securities corporation, its officers or employees to
commit ... (s)uch acts relating to buying, selling or other transactions of securi-
ties .... as may be prescribed by Ministerial Ordinance as prejudicial to the
fairness of transactions or undermining the credibility of the securities industry.
Id.
176. See H. FFRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS 3, 22
(1986) (discussing that the MOF may utilize article 50 to prohibit parties from trading
when information is obtained by virtue of their position).
177. DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 2.02[4].
178. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 35 (Jap.) (elaborating on the applica-
tion of administrative sanctions that the MOF may apply to violators of article 35).
Article 35 provides in pertinent part:
In case that any securities corporation comes under any one of the cases set forth
in the following items, the [MOF] may cancel the license of such corporation or
order to suspend its business in whole or in part for a period which he designates
within six months ... when it violated statutes or disposals taken by an adminis-
trative authorities ....
Id; see also id. art. 64-3 (describing the administrative sanctions available to the MOF
including the cancellation of registration or suspension from trading securities); INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITIES, supra note 149, at § 11.2012] (outlining the administrative
sanctions available to the MOF).
179. INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES, supra note 149, at § 11.12 (citing SHOHO (CoM-
MERCIAL CODE) (as amended by Law No. 74 of 1981), art. 266-3, para. I (Jap.)).
180. See Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 487 (discussing the use of article 189 once in
1963 to recover the short-swing profits of the former chief executive officer of the
Shokusanutakusogo Kabushikikaisha Corporation).
Neither article 189 nor 50 cover the recent Recruit Cosmos insider trading stock
scandal because it involves the private placement of unlisted shares. See All 76 Recruit
Cosmos Shareholders Identified, Daily Yomiuri, Oct. 27, 1988, at 2 [hereinafter Re-




Article 58181 of the SEL is a general antifraud provision. The provi-
sion is modeled after section 10(b) and rule 10(b)(5) of the United
States Exchange Act of 1934.182 Violations of article 58 may result in
the imposition of criminal and administrative penalties.
83
Although article 58 is not regarded as a source of private remedy,""
a violation may give rise to general tort liability under Mimpo Civil
Code article 709.185 As with article 50 violations, company directors
may be held liable for conduct that constitutes bad faith or that is a
December 1984, and the subsequent sale of the shares of stock). The Japanese Securi-
ties and Exchange Law has a private offering exemption limited to fifty persons. JAPA-
NESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 63. Miaswa, supra note 102, at 483 (discussing the
fifty-person limit of the private offering exception to registration).
181. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 58 (Jap.) (prohibiting unfair transac-
tions). Article 58 provides:
No person shall ... employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with re-
spect to buying, selling or other transactions of securities .... obtain money or
other property by using documents or by any representation which contain an
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact nec-
essary to make the statements therein not misleading, or ... make use of false
quotation for the purpose to solicit buying, selling or other transactions of
securities.
Id.
182. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 255 (describing
article 58 as parallel to section 10(b) of the United States Securities Exchange Act).
Section 240.10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
One Japanese scholar has postulated that article 58 has not been utilized as often as
its American model because of the abstract wording of the former. JAPANESE SECURI-
TIES, supra note 84, at 76 n.37.
183. See Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 486 (discussing the criminal and administra-
tive sanctions applicable to violators of article 58). For criminal sanctions to apply, the
violation must have been intentional. Id. The administrative penalties applied are the
same as those applied against violation of SEL article 50. Id. at 487.
184. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 255 (stating
that article 58 does not provide civil remedies).
185. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 192 n.142 (discussing that a vio-
lation under article 58 may give rise to damages under the Civil Code). Under article
709 of the Civil Code "a person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of
another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom." MIbPO (CIVIL
CODE) art. 709 (Jap.).
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grossly negligent breach of their duties. 80 Because article 58 does not
expressly prohibit insider trading, commentators generally believe that
the provision is too vague to be applied to insider trading infractions.
187
In fact, article 58 has not yet been applied to any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceedings.' 88
VI. THE MARKET REGULATORS
A. THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE
1. Regulatory Procedure-Administrative Guidance
Between 1948 and 1952, the Japanese Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (JSEC), modeled after its counterpart in the United States, ad-
ministered the SEL.18 9 In 1952, the JSEC was abolished, 190 and the
MOF assumed its responsibilities.' 9' In 1964, the Securities Bureau,
186. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 255 (holding
directors liable for breach of duties); see also SHOHO (COMMERCIAL CODE) art. 266-3
(Jap.) (stating that where the supervisors and directors are liable for damages sus-
tained by the corporation or third parties, the liability is joint and several).
187. See Kanzaki, Developments in Insider Trading in Japan, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L.
& SEC. REG. 391 (1982) (noting that the provision is too general to apply to potential
insider trading violations).
188. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 192 (stating that article 58 has
never been applied to insider trading); Sato, Securities Administration, in LECTURES
ON JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 97, 101 (1980) (discussing that although the
United States equivalent statutory provision has produced volumes of cases, no reported
cases exist under article 58).
189. See DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 1.02[4][a] (describing the
creation of the Japanese Securities Exchange Commission). The Allies introduced the
concept of independent administrative agencies after World War 11, a concept that the
Japanese did not view favorably. Id. The Japanese Fair Trade Commission, the coun-
terpart to the United States Federal Trade Commission, was also created during this
period. Id.
190. See Miaswa, supra note 20, at 479 (explaining the elimination of the JSEC
because of staff problems); M. TATSUTA, supra note 7, at 4-5 (discussing that the
JSEC was eliminated to simplify the administrative structure); JSRI 1988, supra note
5, at 101 (stating that the JSEC was abolished for economic reasons and noting that
the Chairman of the JSEC had just died prior to its abolition). Although commentators
have forwarded various explanations for the elimination of the JSEC, in actuality, the
JSEC was probably eliminated because of the Japanese dislike for autonomous admin-
istrative agencies. See H. IYoRI & A. UESUGI, supra note 102, at 15 (explaining that
no independent regulatory commission existed in Japan before World War I1); Sato,
supra note 188, at 99 (noting that Japan, unlike the United States, has historically had
an integrated financial administration system); see also infra note 282 and accompany-
ing text (describing government and business leaders criticism and ostracism of the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission, an autonomous administrative agency created during
the same period as the JSEC).




part of the MOF, was established.192 The Securities Bureau is similar
to the SEC; it too has extensive influence over securities transactions
through its rule-making and administrative powers. 3 Unlike the SEC,
however, the Japanese Securities Bureau has the ability to offer "ad-
ministrative guidance." 194
Japanese government agencies implement administrative guidance,
an extra-legal source of government power, for the supervision and
oversight of individuals and public bodies. 196 The power derived from
traditional concepts of government administration is largely carried
over from Japanese imperial theories."9 6 Administrative guidance is
more a mode of expressing power than a source of power.197 The au-
thority for administrative guidance exists in the broad mandates of the
legislation that establishes the government agency. The Securities Bu-
reau of the MOF, like most other Japanese government agencies, may
issue administrative guidance to provide business persons with state-
ments of government policy upon which they may rely in making busi-
ness decisions.1 "' The process of administrative guidance involves the
192. Id.
193. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 15 (describing the creation and the powers of the
JSEC).
194. See Luney, Book Review, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 297, 298 (1983)
(reviewing JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION (1983) (classifying administrative guid-
ance as unique to Japan)).
195. Id. at 298-99; Yamanouchi, Administrative Guidance and the Rule of Law, 7
LAW JAP.: ANN. 22, 22-23 (1974) (defining administrative guidance as advisory and
regulatory guidance).
196. See Lansing & Wechelblatt, Doing Business in Japan: The Importance of the
Unwritten Law, 17 INT'L LAW. 647, 657 (1983) (describing administrative guidance as
a natural outgrowth of the feudal tradition). Government officials, the modern descend-
ants of feudal lords, are respected authorities. Id.
197. See Luney, supra note 194, at 298-99 (quoting D. HENDERSON., FOREIGN EN-
TERPRISE IN JAPAN 200-01 (1973)) (discussing administrative guidance as an extra-
legal source of government power).
198. Id. at 299 (presenting the view that administrative guidance, rather than re-
quiring a statutory basis, exists in broad mandates in establishing the government
agency). Little judicial precedent exists relating to securities law, thus, the MOF's ad-
ministrative guidance exerts great influence over the operation of the securities market
and, surprisingly, foreign companies. See DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at
§ 1.02[4][a] (discussing the importance that the MOF's guidance assumes due to the
lack of judicial precedent). The reliance of administrative guidance is probably reflec-
tive of the Japanese cultural preference for consensus rather than reliance on the writ-
ten word. Id. at § 1.0214] [b]. For example, in a contractual dispute, rather than look-
ing at the specific provisions to define the rights and duties of the parties, many
Japanese believe that the contract language to be secondary. See Hahn, supra note 83,
at 520 (commenting on traditional Japanese contracts which are usually a short, one
page document and "strange animals" to American lawyers); Schrager & Gresser, Go-
ing Public, Japanese Style, Wall St. J., May 2, 1988, at A19 (discussing that foreign
issuers find the Japanese securities markets risky and uncertain because the "rules of
the game" change rapidly, and that "the written rules are the ones that are subject to
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voluntary, consensual performance 99 by an organization or a person in
order to realize the administrative agency's intent.200 The agency's acts
may include: instructions, warnings, cautions, guidance, recommenda-
tions, requests, or advice.21
The MOF may request, through administrative guidance, that com-
panies investigate insiders' securities transactions.20 2 Although compli-
ance with the request is "purely voluntary" and the failure to comply
with the request will not result in an official punishment or a judicial
order to perform, the MOF would suffer an embarrassment if its re-
quest remained unanswered. 0 3 Subsequently, the MOF may become
extremely uncooperative in providing future licenses and regulatory ex-
ceptions to the refusing party.20 4
2. Regulatory Policy
The MOF has publicly denounced insider trading as a serious viola-
tion of business ethics.205 Conversely, administrative guidance has been
traditionally informal and has remained unannounced to the public. In-
dicative of the agency's enforcement attitude, MOF officials have ada-
mantly insisted, as late as 1987, that no insider trading exists in Ja-
pan.20 6 One Japanese commentator has concluded that the MOF does
not want to eliminate securities fraud because, although the agency has
the capability to prosecute securities fraud, it has failed to exercise
it.20 7 The MOF appears to be pursuing a policy of vigorous nonpublic
change, while the unwritten rules appear to be more inflexibly construed").
199. See Yeomans, Administrative Guidance: A Peregrine View, 19 LAW JAP.:
ANN. 125, 158 (1986) (noting that the imposition of formal sanctions would remove
the act from being categorized as administrative guidance).
200. Luney, supra note 194, at 299 (stating that administrative guidance results in
voluntary compliance with government policies).
201. See id. (describing administrative guidance as government agency acts that
may take the form of instructions, requests, warnings, suggestions, and
encouragements).
202. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 255 (discussing
the MOF's request that securities companies investigate the insider purchase or sale
orders before processing these orders).
203. See Luney, supra note 194, at 299 (explaining that failure to comply with
administrative guidance may result in a government agency "losing face" and becom-
ing uncooperative in providing future services, licenses, and permits to noncomplying
parties).
204. Id. Conversely, compliance with administrative guidance may be rewarded
through government subsidies. Id.
205. See Note, Enforcing Securities Regulation, supra note 28, at 256 (describing
the MOF publicly denouncing insider trading as against the "business ethic").
206. See Chira, supra note 121, at D6 (quoting an unnamed MOF official who
denied that insider trading exists in Japan).
207. See Schoenberger, supra note 156, at I (quoting Seijiro Wantanabe's descrip-
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enforcement through administrative guidance while denying that it is
doing so. The denial of the existence of the need for enforcement means
that the MOF has failed to exploit the full potential of deterrence from
the public prosecution of insider trading." 8
B. THE STOCK EXCHANGES
The MOF licenses the securities exchanges.20 9 To receive a license
the securities exchanges must have three basic authoritative guidelines
which regulate the conduct of members of the exchanges: a constitu-
tion, business regulations, and entrustment contract regulations. 10 The
constitution of the TSE, the largest exchange in Japan,2 1' is based on
the constitutions of the New York (NYSE) and San Francisco stock
tion of the MOF as lacking the desire to police against securities fraud). But see
Yanase, supra note 156, at 76-78 (discussing the MOF's use of administrative guid-
ance in an attempt to curb insider trading).
208. See Lansing & Wechelblatt, supra note 196, at 659 (describing administrative
guidance as undemocratic and dangerous because of the lack of accountability). In
addition, as in other applications of administrative guidance, basic structural problems
exist. Id. No legal checks on the power of an agency's use of administrative guidance
and no formal legal recourse for its abuse exist. Id.
Just as no legal checks for overzealous or selective enforcement exist, neither do
checks for underenforcement. Perhaps most damaging is the appearance of an incestu-
ous relationship between the regulating body and the regulated industry, with little
chance of the public discovering the extralegal activity because of the shroud of infor-
mality. See Tanaka & Takeuchi, The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of
the Law: A Comparative Study of Japanese & American Law, 7 LAw JAP.: ANN. 34,
44 (1974) (noting that the resolution of disputes through administrative guidance is
unnoticeable to outsiders). Administrative agencies are then able to monopolize en-
forcement and preclude private litigants from enforcing the law and from knowing
whether the administrative agency is properly performing its responsibilities. Id. at 46.
Moreover, individuals are denied the opportunity to avoid future dealings and subse-
quent harm because of the lack of notice. A. VINER, supra note 100, at 78.
209. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 81 (lap.) (stating that only a securities
corporation may establish a securities exchange). The securities exchange must procure
a licence from the MOF prior to operation. Id. As of 1988, there were eight stock
exchanges in Japan: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Niigata, and
Sapporo. JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at 55. The MOF has not permitted any new ex-
changes since the registration of the original group in 1948. Smith, supra note 153, at q
14-210.
210. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 276-77 (stating that article 82
mandates that an application for a license must be accompanied with a constitution,
business regulations, brokerage agreement standards, and other documents as the MOF
may require).
211. JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at 54 (noting that the volume of transactions be-
tween 1976 and 1986 on all the exchanges may be broken down as follows: TSE 83%,
Osaka Exchange 12%, Nagoya Exchange 4.5%, and the other five exchanges 0.5%).
The TSE is also the largest stock exchange in the world. See NIKKO, supra note 3
(listing total market value and volume of turnover of securities for the Tokyo, New
York, and London stock exchanges).
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exchanges (SFSE). 12 The aims of the TSE constitution are to develop
equitable principles, to promote securities transactions, and to protect
investors. 13
The TSE is a self-regulating organization possessing the sole power
to take action against an exchange member.214 Rather than actively
enforcing the regulations, however, the TSE has merely issued a series
of passive letters to exchange members, lecturing against participation
in fraudulent trading practices. In 1971, the TSE issued a letter dis-
couraging members from engaging in short-swing trading profits"
through insider trading.216 The letter stated that if the TSE found a
securities firm intentionally participating in such trading practices, it
would impose a fine or suspend the corporation's trading activities.21" A
1972 letter requested that stock exchange members scrutinize orders
from corporate insiders.21 8 In 1973, the TSE sent another letter empha-
sizing the importance of avoiding participation in insider trading.219
The TSE has stated that if it finds that a director, officer, or corpora-
tion is involved in insider trading, it will issue a warning. 220 Although
public disclosure would shame the violators,22' the TSE usually does
not publicly disclose the specific findings of any trading investiga-
212. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 132 (discussing that the TSE's
constitution is derived from the constitutions of the NYSE and the SFSE).
213. CONSTITUTION OF THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE art. 2 (1961).
214. See Sato, supra note 188, at 106-07 (noting that the power to take discipli-
nary action is left to the exchanges).
215. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 189 (Jap.) (defining short-swing trad-
ing as the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of shares within six months).
216. See Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 491 (describing the MOF's letter which
stated that upon accepting stock orders from directors, officers, or principal sharehold-
ers, a securities corporation must perform background checks and ascertain the reasons
for the stock orders). If the securities company determines that the transaction violates
a law or regulation, the company "shall warn, and refuse such orders" and report the
refused order to the stock exchange. Id.
217. Id. In 1975, a stock exchange ordered an individual to disgorge short-swing
profits. Id.
218. Kanzaki, supra note 187, at 392.
219. Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 491 n.232.
220. See Jackson & Fingleton, supra note 1, at 158 (quoting Kenjro Egashira, pro-
fessor at the University of Tokyo, as stating that upon a finding of insider trading, the
TSE has only issued informal warnings). Between 1978 and 1981, the TSE conducted
sixty-seven insider trading investigations. Kanzaki, supra note 187, at 392. Between
1973 and 1983, the TSE gave twenty-six insider trading warnings. Id. Alternatively,
the exchanges could restrict a member's right to trade. Jackson & Fingleton, supra
note 1, at 158.
221. See Fingleton & Jackson, supra note 1, at 157 (discussing the power of nega-
tive deterrence in corporate Japan). An alternative interpretation is that because the




tions.212 As a result, the investigations do not serve as an effective de-
terrent. Additionally, the exchanges may only impose private sanctions
on members who violate the exchanges' rules.223 The TSE may also be
reluctant to impose sanctions, because the decision-makers may fear
that a rigorous rule may be applied to their own future transactions.22 4
Moreover, unlike the NYSE,225 the TSE did not have a formal comput-
erized market surveillance program until 1987, making it difficult to
monitor and track any trading violations.226
C. THE JAPANESE SECURITIES DEALERS ASSOCIATION
The SEL created the Japanese Securities Dealers Association (JSDA
or Association)22 7 and patterned it after the United States National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 228 The JSDA is organized
to assure fair trading and protection of investors229 in the over-the-
222. See id. (stating that the industry only publishes an investigation as a last
resort).
223. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 118 (discussing that the available
sanctions that may be levied against exchange members include: a fine, the suspension
or restriction of the right to trade on the floor of the exchange, or expulsion). Some
commentators argue that because no express provision for suspension of membership
exists, the exchange cannot impose this penalty. Id. Because an exchange may expel a
member, however, it should be able to impose the lesser penalty of suspension of trad-
ing. Id.; see also Sato, supra note 188, at 107 (noting that the MOF may revoke the
exchange's license for failure to "take necessary action" against improper traders).
224. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 118 (discussing the reluctance of
the exchanges to impose sanctions because of the fear of creating binding precedent).
225. See Hawes, Insider Trading Law Developments: An International Analysis.
14 LAW & POCY INT'L Bus. 335, 382-83 (1982) (emphasizing the importance of the
NYSE's computerized market surveillance program called the Stock Watch Group
(Group)). The Group watches for unusual fluctuations in corporate stock percentages.
Id. If a corporate development follows the fluctuations, the Group investigates and may
report its findings to the SEC. Id.
226. See So Many Misunderstandings, supra note 164. at 78 (noting that the TSE
first started using a stock transactional monitoring computer system in June 1987);
Sato, supra note 188, at Ill (describing the monitoring of transaction trends in an
attempt to identify manipulation). If "substantial irregularities" are found, the case is
reported to the TSE's Board of Governors. Id.
227. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 67 (Jap.) (listing the requirements for
registration in JSDA).
228. See JAPANESE SEcURITIES, supra note 84. at 99-100 (stating the fact that the
JSDA is patterned after the NASD): JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at 147 (noting that
prior to 1968, the Japanese Federation of Securities Dealers was comprised of one asso-
ciation in each of the thirty-three districts). In 1968. the districts were consolidated
into ten regional blocks. Id. The ten blocks were abolished in 1973 and a single na-
tional organization was established. Id.
229. See JSRI 1988, supra note 87, at 176 (noting that the purpose of the JSDA is
to protect the public and enforce fair business practices).
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counter (OTC) market23  and is registered with the MOF.231 The
JSDA's constitution, 2 2 Rules of Fair Practice,2 33 and Uniform Practice
Rules 2 34 are important supplements to the SEL.
235
The JSDA must provide in its constitution that it will attempt to
prevent fraudulent or manipulative acts and it will promote equitable
principles of trade.236 The JSDA has incorporated into its constitution
an objective to "promote fair practices by member firms in securities
transactions and to maintain the integrity and credibility of mem-
bers. 23 7 For example, a securities company's employee who violates
the rules of the JSDA is subject to an employer's disciplinary proce-
dures.238 If the employee's acts would be damaging to the securities
230. Compare L. Loss, supra note 128, at 674-76 (describing the American OTC
market as a residual, decentralized securities market where broker-dealers and custom-
ers negotiate transactions) with JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 82 (describing
the Japanese OTC market as a wide variety of securities transactions occurring in the
offices of the securities corporations) and Kanzaki, Over-the-Counter Markets, in Lwc-
TURES ON JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 117 (1980) [hereinafter OTC Markets]
(defining the Japanese OTC as loosely organized with private trading conducted be-
tween customers and securities companies). The OTC accounts for approximately six
percent of the volume of all stock exchange transactions. Smith, supra note 153, at 1
14-840.
231. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 29 (stating that the registration of a security
dealer's association is mandatory; membership is optional). But see JAPANESE SECURI-
TIES, supra note 84, at 100 (noting that all Japanese securities companies belong to the
JSDA because commission rate structures make membership pragmatically necessary).
232. See H. FFRENCH, supra note 176, at 23-24 n.7 (describing the JSDA's consti-
tutional aims which are to ensure that members' securities transactions are fair, to
protect investors, and to promote the development of the securities industry). Compare
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 2.02[71[b] (stating that the articles of
incorporation prescribe fundamental matters of the business administration of the se-
curities association as contained in article 71 of the SEL) with Certificate of Incorpora-
tion, Nat'l A. Sec. Dealers, Inc. M. (CCH) N 1003 (May 1988) (providing that
NASD's purpose is to promote "high standards of commercial honor" and to "promote
just and equitable principles of trade for the protection of investors").
233. DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 2.02[71[b] (citing Articles of
Incorporation, article 5, para. I, item 2). Compare id. (noting that the Fair Trade
Practice Rules were established to maintain fairness in securities transactions and to
protect investors interests) with Rules of Fair Play, Nat'l A. Sec. Dealers, Inc. M.
(CCH) T 2151 (Oct. 1987) (noting that a United States NASD member shall observe
high standards of commercial honor and equitable principles).
234. DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 5, at § 2.02[71[b]. Compare id. (stat-
ing that the Uniform Practice Rules are designed to standardize securities transactions
to achieve efficiency and eliminate disputes) with Uniform Practice Code, Nat'l A. Sec.
Dealers, Inc. M. (CCH) T 3501-68 (Oct. 1988) (elaborating the NASD's Uniform
Practice Code).
235. DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 2.02[7].
236. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 71 (Jap.) (stipulating the requirements
for the content of securities dealers' constitutions).
237. See JAPANESE SECURITIES, supra note 84, at 148 n.35 (quoting articles 9.3
and 10 of the Japanese Securities Dealers Association Constitution).
238. Id. at 148 (quoting articles 9.3 and 10 of the Japanese Securities Dealer Asso-
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industry's public image,239 the corporation must also submit an Unethi-
cal Conduct Report.240
In addition, the JSDA may discipline a member firm by censure,
fine, or suspension of trading activities.24 Grounds for disciplinary ac-
tion include violation by a member firm of any law, regulation, regula-
tory guideline, resolution, the JSDA constitution, or the commission of
any act that undermines the integrity and credibility of transactions. 42
Although modeled after the United States NASD,4 3 and despite the
recent development of a market surveillance program, 2 44 the JSDA's
regulatory activity is less vigorous than the NASD.245 Like the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, the JSDA has also sent cautionary letters warning of
insider trading to all Japanese companies listed on the Japanese stock
exchanges.246 The letter urged participants to adhere to the legal guide-
lines, but it did not directly condemn insider trading. -4 7 One Japanese
scholar has suggested that rather than functioning as a self-regulating
body, the Association promotes the interests of the securities
248companies.
The MOF polices the JSDA with its own disciplinary powers. The
MOF may instruct the JSDA to discharge any officer who has failed to
enforce the constitution or other regulation of the Association and may
cancel the registration of the JSDA or suspend its business when it
determines that it is necessary for the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.249 Despite these powers, however, the MOF has not
ciation Rules on the Employers of Securities Corporations).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 102.
242. Id.
243. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing the computerized mar-
ket surveillance program).
244. See OTC Markets, supra note 230. at 120 (noting the existence of the Japa-
nese OTC market surveillance committee). The staff watches for unusual activity and
if activity merits investigation, the staff will conduct a market study. Id. If the JSDA
finds an unusual price variation, the JSDA may suspend either the trading in the par-
ticular stock or the trading by the member company involved. Id.
245. See M. TATsuTA, supra note 89, at 80 (discussing that the JSDA has never
taken the initiative to expel members and has only expelled members who other regula-
tory bodies previously sanctioned).
246. See Tokyo Exchange Puts Out Insider Trading Warning, Wall St. J., June
18, 1987. at 27 (describing the 1987 cautionary letter sent to Japan's listed corpora-
tions and domestic and foreign securities companies). The MOP stated that the letters
were part of a cooperative effort between Japan and the United States. Id.
247. Id.
248. See M. TATSUTA, supra note 89, at 80 (viewing the associations as primarily
concerned with the promotion of public relations of the securities industry).
249. See Securities and Exchange Law art. 75 (Jap.) (stating that the MOF may
cancel, suspend the registration of a securities dealer association, order the association
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invoked any sanctions against the JSDA for failing to enforce insider
trading regulations.
D. PRIVATE LITIGANTS
1. Lack of Securities Litigation
In the United States, federal securities laws do not explicitly prohibit
insider trading. 50 The SEC and judicial decisions have progressively
defined the offense." 1 In the United States, the SEC and private par-
ties have brought many actions2 52 which sharply contrasts with the lack
of litigation in Japan.2 53 Rather than litigating, the MOF has "en-
forced" the SEL provisions through the use of extra-legal administra-
tive guidance. 54 Additionally, the Japanese culture stresses wa, which
may be roughly characterized as a common understanding or consen-
sus.255 The result is an emphasis on parties arriving at a self-negotiated
resolution256 because of their aversion to litigation.25 7
to expel any member who violated the statutes, or order the association to dismiss any
officer who has abused his authority or failed to enforce the constitution).
250. See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 122, at 417 (describing the fact that federal
securities law does not define or clearly forbid insider trading).
251. Id.; see also In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961) (hold-
ing that a corporate insider who possesses material inside information must disclose the
information or must abstain from trading in the security).
252. See M. TATSUTA, supra note 89, at 5 (comparing the large amount of judicial
precedent in the United States with the scarcity of case law in Japan). But see PACIFIC
BASIN, supra note 110, at § 2.4(c) (stating that stare decisis does not exist in Japan).
253. See Miaswa, supra note 102, at 494 (describing the lack of litigation in secur-
ities and hypothesizing that it is a result of cultural and structural bias); DOING BUSI-
NESS IN JAPAN, supra note 87, at § 1.02[4] (noting that Japanese securities regulation
has been given infrequent judicial review); Schoenberger, supra note 156, at 10 (dis-
cussing that no criminal insider trading cases have been tried in the Japanese courts).
254. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text (defining and describing ad-
ministrative guidance).
255. See Hahn, supra note 83, at 518-19 (discussing the importance of the Con-
fucian ideal of social harmony); Kim, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional
Japanese Conception of Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS ON ASIAN LAW 52 (1982) (defin-
ing wa as a Confucian ideal of harmony or concord). If a dispute arises, disharmony
results and a lawsuit further strains the relationship. Id. The "fight to the finish" in a
courtroom is seen as shameful. Id.; see also Introduction to Japanese Law, supra note
83, at T1 8-770 (explaining that wa diverts discord into informal dispute resolution
channels).
The Japanese concept of group harmony may be based on more than Confucian
idealism. See Lansing & Wechelblatt, supra note 196, at 648 (noting that Japan's
agrarian history may explain the adoption of the group-consensus mode of behavior);
Introduction to Japanese Law, supra note 83, at 8-670, 8-730 (describing that the
historical functional interdependency of rice farming contributed to the Japanese aver-
sion to litigation).
256. See Hahn, supra note 83, at 518 (stating the Japanese preference for concilia-
tory self-resolution between the parties).
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2. Japanese Judges, Attorneys, and Procedural Barriers
Unlike judges in the United States, judges in Japan believe they are
more closely restrained by statutory provisions, and, therefore, less
likely to create law.2 58 Moreover, while the United States has over
400,000 lawyers, Japan has only 11,000.25 9 The low number of attor-
neys and the high costs involved in litigation prevent most persons from
using an attorney if a dispute arises.26 0 Additionally, most Japanese
lawyers are not familiar with Japanese securities laws.20 1 Their lack of
knowledge of securities laws, their limited numbers, and the lack of
incentive to develop a securities practice, 6 2 renders them ineffective in
policing the stock markets.263
257. Id. at 519-20 (explaining that many Japanese continue to follow the model of
the traditional precepts of conciliatory dispute resolution). But see Ramseyer, The
Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to
Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 608-09 (1985) (stating that the Japanese reluc-
tance to litigate is primarily based on specific legal procedural barriers rather than a
cultural aversion). Litigation would ensue if the financial disincentives were removed.
Id.
258. See Introduction to Japanese Law, supra note 83, at 1 8-370 (noting that
Japanese judges see their role as interpreting legislative acts rather than creating law).
The judges believe that their exclusive function is to resolve disputes, not to create or
make law. Id.; see also Comment, Shareholders, supra note 102, at 189 (describing
the judiciary's reluctance to consider novel policy arguments). This role of the judges
has led to a reluctance on the part of attorneys to bring suit on matters where no
express precedent exists. Id.. see also Dziubla, The Impotent Sword of Japanese Jts-
tice: The Doctrine of Shobunsei As a Barrier to Administrative Litigation. 18 CoR-
NELL INT'L L. REV. 37, 62 (1985) (noting that few statutory provisions in this area
exist).
259. See Michand, Correcting a Popular Misconception About the Legal Profes-
sion in Japan, N.Y. ST. B.J., Apr. 1986, at 26-27 (noting that the highly restrictive
admission policy at Japan's sole law school, keeps the number of attorneys at an artifi-
cially low quantity); see also E. HAHN, JAPANEE BusiNEss LAW AND THE LEGAL SYS-
TEM 12 (1984) (noting that the main reason for the lack of lawyers in Japan is that the
one law school in the country only admits about 500 of nearly 30.000 applicants each
year). But see Hahn, supra note 83, at 530 (stating that Japan allows a much larger
number of "quasi-lawyers" to work in areas that are normally the domain of attorneys
in the United States).
260. E. HAHN, supra note 259, at 14; see also Ramseyer, supra note 257. at 604
(explaining that the lack of lawyers has led to a scarcity of litigation and a minimal
enforcement of statutes).
261. See Graven, Tokyo Moves Timidly on Insider Trading, Wall St. J.. Aug. 19,
1988, at 8 (quoting Professor Marda of Hosei University as stating that securities law
classes are not taught separately in Japan).
262. See Ishizumi, supra note 116. at 490 (noting that because few attorneys and
ample work exist in Japan, there is no desire to increase business). Put in economics
terms, demand far exceeds supply, facilitating the existence of a -seller's market"
where the attorneys can pick and choose their potential clients, selecting only those that
are most likely to succeed.
263. Id. As a further disincentive to lawyers, the Japanese courts generally allow
low fees to successful attorneys. See Comment, Shareholders, supra note 102, at 183-
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In addition to the attitudes of the Japanese judiciary and bar, poten-
tial litigants face other significant procedural barriers. Upon the initia-
tion of a lawsuit, lawyers typically require a down payment prior to
filing the suit.26 The litigant must also pay a tax to the court in which
the action is filed. 26 5 Furthermore, if the respondent is a corporation, it
may ask for the litigant to post a security for litigation expenses. 6
This security deposit represents a potentially large exposure especially
because of the lack of the availability of class action suits that could
mitigate the costs. 26 7 In addition, the Japanese legal system generally
does not allow for pretrial discovery; 26 8 thus, Japanese courts are solely
vested with the authority to gather evidence.26  The reluctance of the
judiciary to create law 270 and the existent procedural barriers27' create
84 (describing that the Japanese courts have awarded attorney's contingency fees
under the Commercial Code at a rate less than that paid for other causes of action).
264. See Introduction to Japanese Law, supra note 83, at 1 8-550 (describing how
Japanese attorneys typically charge "commencement fees").
265. See id. (stating that a stamp tax of one and one half to two percent of the
amount in controversy must be paid upon filing the court documents); Comment,
Shareholders, supra note 102, at 183 (describing the revenue stamps that must be
purchased and affixed to court documents). Although the percentage is low, if the
amount in controversy is substantial, the expense may be large. Id. at 165. But see
Mayer, Japan: Behind the Myth of Japanese Justice, ANi. LAW., July-Aug. 1984, at
117 (stating that plaintiffs can avoid a large initial payment by understating their dam-
age claims and later amending their claim if the case is proceeding favorably).
266. See Smith, supra note 153, at 1 15-420 (noting that although the Commercial
Code allows for derivative actions, because of the potential for requiring a posting of a
security, fewer derivative actions have occurred in Japan than in the United States).
267. See Tanaka & Takeuchi, supra note 208, at 43 (discussing the lack of availa-
bility of class action suits in Japan).
268. See Mori, supra note 62, at 3 (noting that an attorney cannot gather facts
outside of court and is required to ask for the cooperation of the opposing and third
parties). The only method of pretrial discovery allowed is to use Shoko-Hozen, which
may be used to preserve evidence that might otherwise be lost. Id. Japan's limited
pretrial discovery may be due to structural factors of the legal system rather than soci-
etal factors; Seidel, Introduction and Overview, in EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY IN
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 23 (1984) (explaining that pretrial disclosure in civil
countries is nearly nonexistent).
269. Id. But see PACIFIC BASIN, supra note 110, at § 2.5(D)(1) (noting that ex
officio evidence is not allowed in the Japanese judicial system).
270. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing the preference for self-
resolution between parties).
271. See Mayer, supra note 183, at 114 (describing the "incredible delays" in the
Japanese judicial system as compared with the United States and noting that a con-
tested case can take ten years for final settlement). The Japanese legal system gener-
ally operates at a slower pace than the United States. Id. The extended litigation pro-
cess may, however, reflect Japan's preference for informal dispute resolution. See, The
Judiciary and Dispute Resolution in Japan: A Survey, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 339, 361
(1982) (noting that the drawn out litigation process allows parties' emotions to cool,
thus, facilitating private settlement of disputes). Arguably, rather than facilitating vol-




a chilling effect on potential litigation.
3. "Inside" and "Outside" Shareholders
Shareholders, who were the impetus for the growth of the United
States private securities bar, are viewed much differently in Japan than
in the United States." 2 As discussed earlier, a large number of the
shares are cross-held among corporations, particularly to facilitate bus-
iness relationships and deter hostile takeovers. As a result, corporate
shareholders are viewed as either "inside" or "outside" shareholders.
Japanese corporate directors, referred to as insiders, generally come
from within the company and are committed to the organization rather
than to the shareholders. Japanese management is primarily inter-
ested in the preservation of corporate autonomy and resists shareholder
attempts to encroach in this area. 7 As a result, although Japanese
shareholders may bring derivative suits, 27 1 many shareholders perceive
themselves as outsiders and are thus less likely to bring suit. 76 Inside
272. See H. FFRENCH, supra note 176, at 26 n.63 (describing the Japanese view
that shareholders are only the providers of capital). In the United States, shareholders
are viewed as the owners of the corporation.
273. See Comment, Corporate Extortion in Japan: Sokaiya Endure Commercial
Code Amendment, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 700 (1987) [hereinafter Comment. Cor-
porate Extortion] (discussing the fact that management views the company as pri-
mary). Profits are sought to expand market share rather than to be distributed to
shareholders. Id.; Yamaguchi & Tozuka, The Situation of Corporate Management in
Japanese Corporate System, 18 OSAKA U.L. REV. I, 5 (1971) (noting that Japanese
corporate management considers the organization's assets private property).
274. See Comment, Corporate Extortion, supra note 273, at 700 (explaining how
the management's desire to stifle shareholder dissent led to corporate payoffs being
made to the sokaiya ("thugs")). This situation allowed the sokaiya to gain access to
the higher echelons of these organizations. Id. Management hired sokaiya to attend
shareholder meetings to guarantee minimal discussion of substantive issues and to en-
sure that the meetings end quickly. Motoki, Revision of Corporation Law, in LECTLRES
ON JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 29 (1980) (dividing sokaiya into two groups:
those aiding management; and those opposing management, who receive compensation
for not making trouble at shareholders meetings); Comment, Shareholders. supra note
102, at 170 (describing sokaiya as "gangsters" who maintain order at shareholder
meetings); see also A. VINER, supra note 100. at 92-93 (stating that a 1982 la% made
payments to sokaiya illegal and proscribed prison sentences for guilty sokaiya and par-
ticipating corporate officials). In response to the new law, cash payments were partially
replaced with payments of inside stock information. Id.
275. See Comment, Shareholders, supra note 102. at 182 (describing the right of
Japanese shareholders to bring a derivative suit against corporate directors for failure
to meet their obligations under the Commercial Code); see also Slollo (COMMIERCIAL
CODE), arts. 254-3, 264 to 268, 280 (Jap.) (discussing statutory restrictions on direc-
tors and shareholders).
276. See Comment, Shareholders, supra note 102. at 165 (describing the classifi-
cations of shareholders as those inside the corporation who retain large percentages of
holdings for control and safety, and those outside the corporation). Outside sharehold-
ers are analogous to "second class creditors" in the United States; although they may
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shareholders whose major motivation for ownership is to facilitate rela-
tionships are also unlikely to bring a suit against the corporation.
VII. PROPOSALS
Although the Japanese reliance on informal social enforcement and
social restraint may have been an acceptable substitute for a formal
system of legal requirements in its relatively closed forum with few
participants, the effectiveness of such enforcement is likely to decline as
the number of market participants increases. 77 Given the trend toward
the integration of global equity markets, Japan probably will find itself
under increasing pressure to correct perceived deficiencies in the sys-
tem.178 Japan should effectively respond to these pressures to guard
against erosion of the global investor's confidence in the integrity of the
Japanese stock markets.
A. REESTABLISHING THE JAPANESE SEC
Japan should reestablish an autonomous securities regulatory agency.
A regulator distanced from the regulated entity can more objectively
enforce the laws and regulations. Although the introduction of autono-
mous administrative agencies in Japan after World War II was without
precedent,2 79 the past four decades have demonstrated that such agen-
cies can successfully function in the Japanese system. For example, the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), an independent regulatory
agency, is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the
Antimonopoly Act (Act).
280
The Diet implemented the Act to foster a free and equitable compe-
titive environment.2 81 Business leaders and government officials criti-
cized the Act from its inception and excluded JFTC officials from their
receive small and consistent dividends, they have no control over the management. Id.;
see also Tatsuta, Governance & Shareholders Rights Under the Corporation Law, in
LECTURES ON JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 25 (1980) (stating that shareholders
have no leverage over corporations). Essentially, the corporation's management and
banks excercise control over the corporation. Id.
277. See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 4, at 378 (stating that although informal
market regulations may have been sufficient for a closed system, the increase in market
participants reduces the informalities effectiveness).
278. See Recruit, supra note 180, at 2 (addressing the existence of a current, infa-
mous stock scandal which is likely to result in internal pressure for increased securities
regulations).
279. See H. IORI & A. UESUGI, supra note 102, at 12 (noting that no indepen-
dent regulatory commissions existed before World War II).
280. See Brockman, supra note 137, at § 10.0212] (discussing the establishment of




economic planning groups.28 2 In 1953, the same year of the SEL revi-
sion, the Act underwent major revisions.28 3 Unlike the Japanese Securi-
ties Exchange Commission, however, the J FTC survived, although its
enforcement capabilities were substantially curtailed.284 The J FTC's
anti-monopoly enforcement policies were further complicated because
large corporations formed cartels with the encouragement of the Minis-
try of International Trade and Industry's (MITI) administrative
guidance.286
Because of the changing political and economic climate, the JFTC
gradually began to pursue a more aggressive approach to antitrust en-
forcement. 86 In the late 1970s, the Act provisions were substantially
fortified.287 The JFTC, partially in response to an increase in the pub-
lic's interest in anti-cartel enforcement, began to criticize MITI's ad-
ministrative guidance and successfully prosecuted a MITI sanctioned
oil cartel.2"8
The JFTC has illustrated its willingness to enforce the Act despite
intense political and industry pressure. Like the Japanese experience
with antitrust enforcement in the 1960s, the current Japanese political
climate appears to be growing hostile toward stock trading abuses; de-
mands for regulatory reform and an effective enforcement policy are
increasing. A reestablished, autonomous Japanese SEC could effec-
tively enforce a newly fortified SEL.28 9
282. See Note, Trustbusting, supra note 106. at 1067 (discussing the criticism
prominent Japanese business leaders levied at the Act). The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) was especially critical. Id.
283. Id. at 1068.
284. Id. at 1068-69. The repeated intervention of the MITI and the newly intro-
duced high standards of proof required to prove monopolies. however, complicated the
FTC's enforcement policies. Id. at 1069-72.
285. Id. at 1070-72.
286. Id. at 1073-74. The major impetus was the oil shocks of the 1970s and the
public's outrage at the oil cartels. Id. at 1074.
287. Id. at 1081-83. One commentator has described the late 1970s as a period
when the JFTC "finally reached maturity." IYORI & UESLGI, supra note 102. at vii.
288. See Note, Trusibusting, supra note 106, at 1076-78 (stating that public pres-
sure led to the JFTC's decision to prosecute a cartel for limiting production and fixing
prices).
289. In the alternative, the JFTC could absorb the responsibilities for securities
enforcement. Prior to the formation of the SEC. the United States Federal Trade Com-
mission regulated securities transactions. See M. PARRISh1, SECURITIEs REGULATION
AND THIE NEW DEAL 43-44 (1970) (tracing the development of securities regulation in
the United States).
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B. REVISE THE SEL
1. Expand Article 188
Japan's recent revision of article 188 may serve to allow potential
plaintiff-shareholders notice of insider violations involving the purchase
and sale of securities.2 90 The Japanese Diet enlarged the scope of arti-
cle 188 beyond officers, directors, and ten percent shareholders to in-
clude "tippees." '29 The amendment, however, remains silent regarding
the liability of remote tippees.2 92 The SEL should be revised to include
punishment of those individuals who receive material nonpublic infor-
mation by virtue of their position and then effectuate a trade based on
that knowledge.
2. Clarify Article 58 to Explicitly Prohibit Insider Trading
The Japanese government should clarify and refine article 58 to
make it clear that insider trading is prohibited. In the United States,
judicial precedent significantly contributes to the shaping of broadly
stated statutes. As previously discussed, because of the Japanese prefer-
ence for nonlitigious dispute resolution and the presence of various sys-
temic barriers, a parallel judicial development has not occurred. There-
fore, the Diet should more precisely define the provision and clearly
state that article 58 applies to insider trading and that liability will
attach to violators.29 3
CONCLUSION
The regulation of the global securities market requires an awareness
to the unique features of each country. The Japanese experience in se-
curities regulations can not be separated from the distinct realities of
the Japanese cultural environment. 294 As Japan's postwar adoption of
the securities laws of the United States illustrates, unilateral attempts
at forcing change upon an unwilling country is not enough to alter cul-
turally specific behavior. An increase in the number of players on the
290. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing that the MOF will
publish exports of short-swing transactions).
29 1. Id.
292. Id.; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 (1976) (holding that
a remote tippee is one who receives material nonpublic information secondhand).
293. See Ishizumi, supra note 116, at 493 (proposing that article 58 should be
amended to make it clear that it applies to insider trading and that wrongdoers will be
subject to civil penalties).
294. See Luney, supra note 194, at 301 (noting that political and administrative
processes play an integral role in Japanese securities regulation).
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world market and a smaller global playing field, as a result of interna-
tionalization, however, require a change in Japanese laws and mandate
a continued response from the Japanese government insuring global
parity in securities trading practices.
